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I. INTRODUCTION 
Contract law primarily focuses on differentiating between promises 
that warrant enforcement and promises that do not. 1 The courts and 
classical commentators use principles of voluntarism2 as the main 
theoretical standard to demarcate between enforceable, valid contracts 
and unenforceable, invalid ones. 
The duress defense reflects the importance of consent III contract 
law by excusing a contract obligation if the agreement IS coerced3 
I We could imagine a world in which promises were enforceable simply on the basis of the 
moral suasion of the promise. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 8 (1981) ("By promising we 
transform a choice that was morally neutral into one that is morally compelled."). So conceived, 
a promise alone could trigger contract liability. If the promissory quality of a statement alone 
could result in its enforceability, then the legal inquiry would be limited to an examination of 
the words used to determine whether they were promissory. Once a statement is determined 
to be a promise, it would be binding. Such a system would obviate the need for careful legal 
delineation between enforceable and unenforceable promises. Nevertheless, "[iJt is indeed very 
doubtful whether there are many who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in which 
one would be obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the present more viable system, in 
which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 
553, 573 (1933) . For various reasons, the law limits the types of promises that are enforced. 
See C. FRIED, supra, at 3 (discussing the limited nature of promise enforcement); see also 
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (reviewing the will, 
reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain theories of contract and advocating the adoption of a 
consent theory to determine which contracts should be enforced); Cohen, supra, at 571-85 
(reviewing the history of contract law and discussing a variety of theories used to justify the 
enforcement of promises). 
This focus on contract formation and enforcement has prompted criticism from some scholars 
who have urged that greater attention be devoted to practical problems of contract performance. 
See, e.g., Farnsworth, A Fable and A Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 206, 208-09 (1987). 
2 As one commentator observed: 
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is an essential feature of our 
moral , political, and legal discourse . ... 
. . . Our moral and legal responses to individual behavior are typically based on (what I 
shall call) tlu! voluntariness principle. The general assumption is that promises are binding, 
rights can be waived, and punish!p~nt appropriately applied if, but only if, the relevant 
actions are voluntary. 
A. WERTHEIMEH, COERCION 3-4 (1987). 
Others have observed that "'actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed 
under compulsion .. . . An act is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind 
that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it.'" Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"­
Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 564 n.85 (quoting ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 
[NICHOMACHEANj III, at l109b30-1110aI6 (J. Thomson trans. 1976». 
" Initially the doctrine of duress reflected the importance of the principle of voluntarism as 
a determinant of enforceability. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. 
L. REV. 253, 254-56 (1947) (discussing how the concept of duress evolved to dovetail with free 
will notions). But see Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C.L. REv. 615, 638 
(1982) (explaining the current conceptual basis for duress claims as one to "distinguish between 
4 
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or not fully voluntary.4 The law will enforce only consensual agree­
ments5-those that are reached voluntarily. If a promisor is co­
bargains that enhance the prospects for mutual benefit and those that do not"). 
The duress defense is powerful because it raises the fundamental issue of the degree of 
consensual behavior required to trigger contract liability. Under a system committed to vol­
untarism, see supra note 2, the plea that" 'I was forced into doing it,''' A. WERTHEIMER, supra 
note 2, at 3, seems particularly compelling. 
Traditionally, scholars did not confront the question of what minimum amount of choice was 
required to validate an agreement. This was largely a result of the mythical but widespread 
perception that parties had autonomy and that real differences in bargaining power, market 
leverage, or wealth did not impair such autonomy. Under this view, all contracting parties were 
presumptively free to choose, or not, as they wished. Moreover, because "[c]apitalist theory 
typically assumes that market transactions are voluntary and uncoerced, even if they are made 
against a background of economic necessity," A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 4-5, courts did 
not confront issues of impaired choice that might result from such economic necessities. See 
also Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 195, 
207 (1987) (describing two "paranoid" individuals negotiating at arm's length as the conceptual 
basis of classical contract law); Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as 
an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 475-76 (1983) (discussing the 
presumption of equality among all contracting parties in classical contract law and its continuing 
impact) . 
Recognition of a duress-based excuse from contractual obligations illustrates a modern tendency 
to provide avoidance mechanisms for parties who are unfairly disadvantaged by the bargaining 
process. This insures that contracts comport with relevant societal norms. See, e.g., Hillman, 
The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 104 (1988) ("Although based in 
part on the principle of freedom of contract, modern contract law is also tempered . . . by 
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, that focus on fairness and the interdependence 
of parties rather than on parties' actual agreements."); see also Dalton, An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1024 (1985) ("The doctrines of duress 
and unconscionability are self-consciously 'public' insofar as they are designed to police the 
limits of 'fair' bargain."). Expanded notions of fraud and undue influence serve much the same 
purpose. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 523-27 (1978) 
(discussing expanded notions of actionable fraud) . 
This Article, while recognizing the jurisprudence of duress as a tool for promoting distributive 
justice and fairness , posits other, as yet unrecognized, policies that are either implicit in extant 
case law or that should be adopted to guide duress outcomes. These policies, which are not 
based on fairness, serve to reorient the jurisprudence away from duress as an altruistic doctrine. 
See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J . 359, 365, 120 A.2d 11, 13 (1956) (explaining 
that the basis of the duress doctrine is the absence of "actual consent") . 
Commentators have criticized the notion that coerced agreements are not enforceable because 
they evidence less than "real" consent. These scholars have argued that contrary to accepted 
notions, the consent in coerced agreements is very real. Professor Dalzell, for example, states: 
When we do stop to think about it, however, it is ... plain that the more unpleasant the 
prospective alternative, the more genuine is the consent to the contract nece8sary to escape 
that alternative; in other words, that the consent to a contract resulting from duress is 
probably far more real than the typical contractual consent. 
Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237, 240 (1942) [hereinafter Dalzell, 
Duress /]; see also Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 
606 (1943) (arguing that even choices made between unpalatable alternatives are the result of 
free will); Philips, Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PHIL. 133, 133-34 (1984) 
("The supposition that coerced actions are involuntary is the result of a natural error ... . A 
coerced agent is presented with unwanted, unpleasant alternatives, but is free to choose and to 
act upon the least obnoxious of them."). As Justice Holmes explained" 'lilt always is for the 
585 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
erced into entering into a contract, she is entitled to avoid the 
agreement at her option6 because the agreement does not de-
interest of a party under duress, to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice 
was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly 
so called.'" Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918), quoted in Hale, 
supra, at 618. 
Professor Dawson's critique of the "reality of consent" standard, see Dalzell, Duress I, supra, 
at 238·40, was the most trenchant of all. See Dawson, supra note 3. Dawson posited that the 
very notion of consent was a false one since all agreements were coerced. See id. at 266. It 
follows that it makes no sense to separate valid from invalid agreements depending on whether 
the consent was real. 
• The Restaterrumt retlects the consensual ism standard when it states: "the formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and a consideration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979) . Orthodox bargain 
theory constituted the traditional mechanism for insuring a mutual exchange. 
Recently, critics have undermined the centrality of the consensual model by delegitimizing 
it and depicting it as a vehicle for protecting privilege and oppression. "[I]n modern society, 
we have begun to question the legitimacy of the order of power established by the uninhibited 
exploitation of the potentialities of ownership and knowledge." H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT 12 (1986); see also R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 121 (1986) 
(discussing trends in the critical legal studies movement involving theorists who posit law's 
function in perpetuating "social divisions and hierarchies"); Feinman, Critical Approaclu!s to 
Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 852 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical Approaclu!s] 
(discussing the function of "[contract] law as a legitimating ideology and as an expression of 
legal consciousness" which "conceal[s] the reality of economic injustice in society"); Hillman, 
supra note 3, at 110·13 (discussing the Critical Legal Studies idea that contract law legitimizes 
the perpetuation of inequalities) . 
Modern critics have also debunked notions of consensualism by depicting the liberal conception 
of contract law, on which consensualism is premised, as value laden rather than value neutral. 
See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780·1860, at 201 (1977) ("The 
emergence of the objective theory, then, is [a] measure of the influence of commercial interests 
in the shaping of American Law .... [A] legal ideology of formalism [was elaborated] that 
could . . . disguise gross disparities of bargaining power under a facade of neutral and formal 
rules ...."). This critique opened the legal system up to questioning on the nature of its 
adopted underlying values, including the value of consensual exchange. 
Legal critics have also undermined the centrality of the consensual ism principle of individual 
freedom to contract by emphasizing the "counterprinciples" of community and family. See, e.g., 
R. UNGER, supra, at 60·75. These competing principles lead to indeterminate results because 
the judiciary has to choose between conflicting values. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1006, 1010· 
12 (discussing the "tension" attributable to the clash between liberal freedom of contract and 
regulatory conceptions of contract law); Feinman, Critical Approaclu!s, supra, at 847 (positing 
that "the two [models of individual autonomy and collectivism] are fundamentally in conflict"). 
Some recent scholarship has sought to reaffirm the importance of consensualism principles 
in contract law, albeit in a modified form. 
If the "death of contract" movement is a product of a disillusionment with and abandonment 
of both the will theory of contract as a distinct source of contractual obligation and the 
bargain theory of consideration as the means of formally distinguishing between enforceable 
and unenforceable exercises of the will, the "resurrection of contract" is a recognition of 
contract law's proper function as a transfer mechanism that is conceptually dependent on 
more fundamental notions of individual entitlement. 
Barnett, supra note 1, at 321; see, e.g., Kostritsky, A New Tlu!ory of Assent·Based Liability 
Emerging Under tlu! Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explcmation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. 
REV. 895, 905·08 (1987) (advocating an approach focusing on assent as a basis for finding 
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serve enforcement. 7 
Duress cases involve multifarious fact patternsB in which the alleged 
coercer offers her victim two unpalatable alternatives. Arche­
typal choices are: "your money or your life"9 or "your last ten 
contractual liability in cases in which explicitly reciprocal or formalized contracting is unlikely 
to occur); see also Feinman, Contract After the Fall (Book Review), 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537, 
1538 (1987) (reviewing H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986» (describing neoclassical 
scholars' use of assent-based theory to "produce predictable, yet flexible, legal doctrines that 
balance mutual assent and public regulation") . 
6 A successful duress claim permits avoidance of the obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment d (1979) ("Duress by threat results in a contract voidable by 
the victim."); see also E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.19, at 267 (1982) (recognizing a 
duress victim's right to avoid contracts induced by threats); Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist 
Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 65, 65 (1985) (recognizing duress as one of many "legal excuses and pleas in 
avoidance"). 
Because duress renders the contract voidable but not void, the victim is given the option of 
performing or not. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 4.19, at 267. Nevertheless, some contracts 
involving duress are void: those that involve nonvolitional behavior. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra 
note 2, at 46; see also infra note 9 (discussing nonvolitional behavior). 
7 See Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Clwices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 81 (1981) (noting 
that under duress "any agreement [a party] makes is not morally binding"); see also A. 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 46 (proposing a theory that "yields the conclusion that a contract 
is binding if and only if it ought to be binding"). Professor Wertheimer states that "[a] coerced 
promise is not morally binding." Id. at 3; see also Mather, supra note 3, at 625 n.33 (indicating 
that "duress is coercion inducing an agreement the law ought not to enforce"). 
8 Claims of duress regularly involve varied fact patterns. Professor Dalzell deftly broke these 
situations down into: (1) refusals to tum over goods to their owner; (2) refusals to provide 
utility services; (3) threats by government officials; (4) threat.s to breach contracts; and (5) 
threats by one spouse against the other. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 241-77. Current 
commentators treat duress claims differently, often considering all fact patterns together and 
developing theories to identify the central elements of coercion to be applied across a wide 
range of situations. See Westen, supra note 2, at 559, 559-69 (identifying the "core elements 
of coercion"); see also A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2 (examining the concept of coercion from 
both a philosophical and a legal perspective); Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND 
METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NM;EL 440 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White 
eds. 1969) (discussing the conditions for coercion generally). 
9 This "paradigm" case is discussed by Professor Wertheimer in A. WERTH EIMER, supra note 
2, at 6-7. Professor Frankfurt would call proposals of this ilk "biconditional." Frankfurt, Coercion 
and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 65, 66 (T. Honderich ed. 1978). 
For example, "when a highwayman tells a traveller that it's his money or his life, biconditionality 
is presumably intended: the highwayman will kill the traveller if the traveller refuses to hand 
over his money, while he will spare his life otherwise." Id. at 66-67. The case of the threatened 
death to the robbery victim would constitute physical duress. These "paradigmatic" situations 
have provided a ready basis for excuse even in the traditional world of limited relief from 
contract liability. See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72. 
The above example involves a "constrained" choice. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
A constrained choice is "one where the agent is confronted with unwanted alternatives, but is 
quite capable of making rational choices among them." Id. at 9; see also Fingarette, supra note 
6, at 74 (distinguishing rational choices made between undesirable alternatives from "sheer 
mindless panic"). Professor Wertheimer discusses the concept of constrained choices by con­
trasting them with "nonvolitional acts." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9. Nonvolitional 
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cents for a loaf of bread." 10 Duress defenses also arise when: a promi­
sor threatens not to perform unless she secures added compen­
acts are characterized by "either serious loss of the ability to reason, or serious loss of self­
control from causes other than the loss of reasoning ability" and thus would result in void 
contracts. Fingarette, supra note 6, at 76. Professor Wertheimer describes such "involuntary 
acts [as] involv[ing] a defect of volition." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9. These acts are 
comparatively rare, and clearly do not warrant enforcement. Id. at 30 (discussing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 492(a»; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962) ("A 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."), discussed 
in Fingarette, supra note 6, at 76 n.29. 
An inequality of resources, which restricts the contract alternatives that are available, con­
tributes to constrained choice. See H. COLLINS, supra note 5, at 58 ("In practice, people suffer 
constraints from shortages of resources, the costs of action and inaction, and subordination to 
the interests of others."). Admittedly, inequalities of resources constrain freedom, and "[a]dvocates 
of capitalism need not deny that A's property rights restrict B's freedom to do what he wants 
or to satisfy his preferences." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 253; see also Frankfurt, supra, 
at 83-84 (discussing how reactions to the conditions which limit choice differ depending upon 
whether the limits are environmentally created or the result of human intervention). 
Traditionally, the law has tolerated such cases of constrained choice and refused affected 
parties contract avoidance because 
fo r the most part our habitual Anglo-Saxon individualism has been in control of the common 
law, so as to make any such curb exceptional. We have been proud of our "freedom of 
contract," confident that the maxImum of social progress will result from encouragement of 
each man's initiative and ambitiun by giving him the right to use his economic powers to 
the full. 
Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 237; see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 82 (discussing the 
argument for "legitimate ' inequalities of fortune'" (quoting Justice Pitney in Coppage v. Kansas, 
236 U.S. I, 17 (1914») ; Westen, supra note 2, at 560 (positing that coercion does not result 
from natural conditions but from "[a~ constraint ... brought to bear on an agent ... by 
another agent"). As the illusory nature of the freedom model became apparent, see Kessler, 
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
632 (1943), the courts expanded the duress excuse to offer relief in cases of choice constrained 
by economic pressures. S ee supra note 3. 
10 Professor Dalzell relies on the bread example to illustrate the limits continually placed on 
our freedom by the alternatives that we confront. "I agree to pay ten cents for a loaf of bread, 
not because I want to give the baker ten cents, but because that's the only way I can get the 
bread. I am choosing between alternatives, giving up the dime or doing without the bread." 
Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239. If courts were to find duress on the facts of the bread 
case, they would be giving parties a free way out of contractual obligation based on "inequalities 
of fortune," supra note 9, for which tile other party was not responsible. Denying duress claims 
in such circumstances would be consistent with an ideal of individualism in which each party 
is "entitled to enjoy the benefits of [its] efforts without an obligation to share or sacrifice them 
to the interests of others." Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713 (1976). For a discussion of the benefits of a system indifferent to 
sharing, see Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at 839-42 (discussing self-reliance and 
welfare maximization as two of the primary benefits of an individualistic ethos). 
If courts broadened available excuses to include economic need, they would be administering 
legal rules to favor the less fortunate based on principles of altruism. For a discussion of this 
competing principle of altruism in modern contract law, see w. at 842-44 (listing the core 
elements of the collectivist ideal for deciding contracts cases including social values and inter­
dependence). See also Kennedy, supra, at 1717-22 (elaborating on the elements of the altruistic 
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sation II or other concessions, such as more favorable treatment in 
unrelated contracts;12 a debtor offers a creditor a settlement at less 
than the amount actually owed;13 an employer threatens an employee 
with termination or other undesirable consequences unless the em­
ployee agrees to accept an unfavorable settlement on a compensation 
claim;14 an employer threatens not to hire an employee unless the 
employee kicks back part of her wages;15 someone threatens to crim­
inally prosecute an adult child unless the parents deed their home 
to the coercer;16 or a person threatens to withhold a lifesaving drug 
or rescue unless the victim pays an "exorbitant" sum. 17 
ideal). If altruism determined outcome, there might be a disincentive to do business with parties 
of lesser wealth for fear that courts would routinely overturn the contractual obligations of the 
injured party. 
II See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding that 
second contract for greater compensation entered into upon refusal to perform first contract 
was unenforceable for lack of consideration); Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 120 Ill. 
App. 3d 907, 912-13, 458 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1983) (second contract for additional compensation 
not found to be coercive in absence of evidence that legal redress would have been inadequate). 
12 See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971) (holding that a refusal to supply goods under an existing contract unless 
the purchaser agreed to buy supplier's goods for an unrelated contract was coercive). 
13 Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) 
(holding actionable a claim of duress by a company in imminent danger of bankruptcy which 
accepted $97,500 in satisfaction of a contract claim valued at between $260,000 and $300,000); 
Rich & Whillock, Inc. V . Ashton Dev. , Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984) 
(relying on Totem for a similar holding). 
I. See, e.g., Perkins Oil CO. V. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938) (upholding a 
jury finding of duress when an employer threatened to discharge the stepfather of an employee 
injured at his workplace unless the employee accepted an unfavorable personal injury settlement 
offer); Wise V. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (duress claim allowed 
when a current employer threatened a discharge if the employee did not accept an unfavorable 
settlement offer for unpaid wages made by the previous employer); Mitchell V. C.C. Sanitation 
Co., 430 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (holding actionable a claim of duress by an at will 
employee threatened with discharge unless he signed a release for personal injuries sustained 
while working). 
"Caivano V. Brill, 171 Misc. 298,11 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Mun. Ct. 1939). 
16 Haumont V. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W.2d 2 (1985). 
17 Economists might question the assertion that any price could be "exorbitant" even for a 
lifesaving drug. The theory would be that the price, though high, is value-maximizing for the 
sick person because the price represents the value attached to the drug because of its lifesaving 
capacity. The economists might, however, refuse to enforce a similar promise made in another 
context, but for a different reason. If A agrees to aid B, who is lost in a snowstorm, only if 
B cedes all her wealth to A, Judge Posner would refuse enforcement because if courts awarded 
" the whole value of the rescue, . . . people [would be induced] to take socially excessive 
precautions to avoid having to be rescued, as well as inducing an excessive investment in 
resources devoted to rescue." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (1986) (footnote 
omitted). 
The example of having to pay a very high price for a lifesaving drug is discussed in Murphy, 
supra note 7, at 83. Professor Murphy argues that if the pressure on the victim results from 
circumstances not caused by the " coercer," "then it seems that something stronger is needed 
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In all of these cases one person pressures another into making 
contract concessions or accepting unfavorable terms that she would 
not otherwise have agreed to had other, more desirable, alternatives 
existedI8 or had the coercion not been applied. I9 The victim acquiesces 
because the coercer's superior bargaining power, or the victim's des­
perate circumstances, leaves little room to resist or to bargain for 
better terms. The court's task is to determine when the promisor 
should be offered a reprieve from her ordinary contract obligations 
because the underlying agreement is not voluntary. 
The current law of duress is wholly unsatisfactory. This is due in 
part to a misguided focus on whether duress is a public or pri­
vate doctrine. In the heyday of classical contract law, courts and 
commentators focused on private law concepts, viewing duress as 
a means hy which parties could escape agreements that contra­
vened their will.20 Professor Dawson offered another conceptual 
to free me from my obligation than the claim that all of my alterp'ltives are grim or the claim 
that the situation is not my fault." [d. Permitting avoidance merely because the sick party 
faced grim and desperate chok es would potentially open up all bargains to avoidance claims. 
" The freedom to choose is never untrammeled and rarely does one have the freedom to 
choose among only desirable alternatives. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239 ("[I]t is easy 
to forget that a will exercises its freedom only in selecting one of several possible courses of 
action."). The fact that the choice is constrained does not automatically lead to a successful 
duress claim. 
19 Professor Westen voices this formulation of coercion when he states "[t lo say that X, 
'coerced' X into doing something means that X chose to do something that, but for the constraint 
or promise of constraint Xl brought to bear on him, X would not have chosen to do." Westen, 
supra note 2, at 565-66; see also Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, NOMOS XIV (Am. Soc'y Pol. 
& Legal Phil.) 19 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1972) ("[A] further requirement for a person 
to be coerced is that he would have chosen differently had he not been threatened."). 
2Q Professor Atiyah and others have rejected the ov,~rborne will theory as a conceptual basis 
for duress. Atiyah argues for its abandonment in Atiy&h, Economic Duress and the "Overborne 
Will, " 98 LAW Q. REV. 197, 201 (1982) (suggesting that will theory belongs on the "historical 
scrapheap"). See also Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of the Free Will Theory: A 
Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 IOWA L. REV. 892, 894 (1968) ("The free will concept, however, has 
serious shortcomings. Because both normal contracts and those formed under duress result from 
a choice between alternative evils, it is impossible to distinguish one situation from the other 
on the basis of any difference in the_,freedom of the consent."). Professor Fingarette suggests 
that although the language used to describe overborne will theory, Fingarette, supra note 6, at 
71, is "rhetorically rich," it lacks "objective specificity of meaning." [d. at 72. Accordingly, he 
would redirect the inquiry to whether there was "unfair choice." Id. at 79. 
Despite the criticism of the overborne will theory as an explanation for duress ca~.e outcomes, 
courts continue to use the free will standard as an arbiter of enforceability. See, e.g., Wilson 
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 228 So. 2d 229, 232 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (rejecting economic 
duress as a ground for invalidating release and noting that duress involves free will being 
overborne); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 51 , 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950) 
(indicating that the test of coercion is "whether the coercion was of such a character as to 
overcome the free will of the victim"); Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatls, 719 S.W.2d 64, 
68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that "[t]he evidence showed a fear of criminal penalties and 
other consequences, which may not have actually existed, but the threats af which may have 
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basis,21 positing that duress serves a public, not private, function. 22 
In Dawson's view, the duress defense is an "underground"23 method 
of policing abuses in the bargaining process, regulating inequalities 
of bargaining power,24 and correcting inadequacies of consideration.25 
Moreover, his perception of the "broader objectives"26 of duress law 
fueled a philosophical debate that still rages: Is contract law primarily 
concerned at its "core"27 with facilitating private bargains free from 
been sufficient to overcome the duress claimant's free will"}; Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 
359, 365, 120 A.2d 11 , 13 (1956) ("Duress in its more extended sense means that degree of 
constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, sufficient in severity 
or in apprehension to overcome the mind or will of a person of ordinary firmness .. ..") ; Port 
of Nehalem v. Nicholson, 122 Or. 523, 259 P. 900 (1927) (positing a standard for duress based 
on overcoming free will) , overruled on other grounds, Godell v. Johnson, 244 Or. 587, 418 P.2d 
505 (1966); First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1982) (using a test for duress based on overcoming free will). 
21 Professor Dawson's 1947 article is still considered the seminal work on duress. See Dawson, 
supra note 3. It not only reoriented conceptual theories of duress but also undermined the 
traditional importance of the much vaunted, and in Dawson's view, much overrated, concepts 
of consensualism and private autonomy in contract law. Id. at 266-67; see also supra note 5 
(tracing the debunking of consensualism In the literature) . 
" Among the public factors Professor Dawson identified as determining outcome in duress 
cases are unequal bargaining power and unjust enrichment. Dawson, supra note 3, at 253, 282­
83; see also Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: II, 45 MICH. L. REV. 679, 715 (1947) 
(suggesting the importance of gain by coercer in context of duress claims); Hale, supra note 4, 
at 628 (suggesting a public approach based on "judicious legal limitation on the bargaining 
power of the economically and legally stronger" party in the context of duress); Note, supra 
note 20, at 896-900 (documenting various public policies behind the duress doctrine that can 
be used to supplement analysis in deciding duress cases) . 
Courts have legitimized the importance of the bargaining power factor in deciding duress 
claims. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (finding 
that the duress claimant lacked reasonable alternatives in the face of duress attributable to the 
"superior bargaining power" of the purported coercer); Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 480 
N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no actionable duress because the purported coercer 
"was not in a dominant position"); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. 1011, 
1014, 453 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1982) (scrutinizing the bargaining process and finding "free and 
voluntary negotiations" based on changes in the terms of an agreement which benefitted the 
plaintiff); Ross Sys. v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 N.J. 329, 337-38, 173 A.2d 258, 263 (1961) 
(finding duress when claimant franchisee was forced to make overpayments to a franchisor 
whose control prevented franchisee from pursuing litigation as an alternative) ; Caivano v. Brill, 
171 Misc. 298, 299, 301, 11 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500, 502 (Mun. Ct. 1939) (finding duress in a kickback 
arrangement between employer and employee based on "clear recognition of the fact that 
employer and employee do not meet as equals"). 
2;< G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 56-57 (1974) (discussing "case law undergrounds" 
involving a "pre-contractual duty"). For a further discussion of these "undergrounds," see 
Gordon, Book Review, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1216 (reviewing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 
(l974}) . 
2< Dawson, supra note 3, at 253. 

25 Id. at 276-82. 

26 Id. at 253. 

27 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1737 (discussing the traditional concept of classical contract 
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state interference, with public regulation of unfair agreements being 
mere sideshows; or is such a core principle impossible precisely because 
of the important countertendency of public regulation,28 thereby lead­
ing to open warfare between private and public norms?29 
The philosophical debate only serves to distract decisionmakers 
from important duress issues. Furthermore, the articulations and 
applications of the duress rule itself are unsatisfactory. Courts have 
faced intractable problems in determining if coercion exists in a 
particular case. Courts and commentators have articulated different 
theories of coercion-including theories based on will or morality­
in the hope that a statement of an overall theory can be used to 
define the "core elements"30 of the defense. These theories, however, 
law consisting, at the core, of principles founded on autonomy and individualism in which the 
"existence of countertendencies was acknowledged, but in a backhanded way" and relegated 
away from the core to the "periphery"); see supra note 5 (discussing this conflict in the scholarly 
literature). 
2' For a discussion of the role of counterprinciples and norms in modern contracts jurisprudence, 
see R. UNGER, supra note 5, at 60-75. See also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1010-12 (discussing 
public values that stand in opposition to private values of autonomy and the suppression of 
such values by the traditional contract model); Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at 
834 (discussing the emergence of tort-like values into the previously private world of contract); 
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1713-24 (discussing counterprinciples of individualism and altruism). 
,. Legal scholars and philosophers have fiercely debated the issue of whether contract law is 
private in the sense that it merely implements the private agenda of the parties or whether it 
has a public component that actively interferes with private choices in order to validate important 
social values of fairness and community. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 5, at 60-75 (discussing 
"counterprinciples" to freedom of contract values); see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1010-39 
(discussing the history of "public" and "private" aspects of contract theory); Feinman, Critical 
ApproacMs, supra note 5, at 830-36 (discussing the values of individualism in the classical 
model and public policy agenda in modern contract law); Gordon, supra note 3, at 207-13 
(contrasting public with private values); Hillman, supra note 3, at 104 (noting the "conflicting 
principles" of autonomy and fairness); Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1685 (discussing the impact 
of approaches based on "individualism" and "altruism" as applied to substantive private law 
issues); Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 958-61 (discussing this fundamental contradiction in modern 
contract theory) . 
30 One device for identifying coercive proposals focuses on the distinction between coercive 
threats and noncoercive offers, with "[t]he most fundamental difference between threats and 
offers . . . [being] this: a threat holds out to its recipient the danger of incurring a penalty, 
while an offer holds out to him the possibility of gaining a benefit." Frankfurt, supra note 9, 
at 67. 
The difficulty with the threat/offer distinction is that all contracts contain implied threats. 
Dawson, supra note 3, at 266 ("[T]he freedom of the 'market' was essentially a freedom of 
individuals and groups to coerce one another ....") . Moreover, in order to apply the test one 
requires a further device for determining when a penalty exists. Professor Westen proposes a 
definitional paradigm for coercion which can be used in determining if a penalty exists: 
(13) a constraint or promise of constraint, Y, that XI knowingly brings to bear on X in 
order that X choose to do something, ZI' that X would not otherwise do and that X does 
not wish to be constrained to do, where X knows that XI is bringing or promising to bring 
Y to bear on him for that purpose, and where the constraint renders X's doing ZI more 
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are inadequate because they are unworkable and because they inhibit 
courts from considering important policy concerns. Confusion prevails 
in duress law;3! consequently courts cannot reach consistently sound 
results. 
The "will theorY,"32 which attempts to ascertain whether the coer­
cer's pressure or threat has actually overborne a claimant's will,33 is 
defective because it requires courts to ascertain the unknowable: the 
actual intent of the party alleging duress.34 Morality-based theories 
eligible to X than it would otherwise be. 
Westen, supra note 2, at 569. 
Joseph Raz offers his own definition of coercion as follows: 
P coerces Q into not doing act A only if . . . 
(1) P communicates to Q that he intends to bring about or have brought about some 
consequence, C, if Q does A. 
(2) P makes this communication intending Q to believe that he does so in order to get 
Q not to do A. 
(3) That C will happen is, for Q, a reason of great weight for not doing A. 
(4) Q believes that it is likely that P will bring about C if Q does A and that C will 
leave him worse off, having done A, than if he did not do A and P did not bring about C. 
(5) Q does not do A. 
(6) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or to lessen) the likelihood of C by 
making it less likely that P will bring it about. 
Raz, Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in 7 MIDWEST STlmlES IN 
PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 89, 108 (P. French, T. Uehling, Jr. & H. 
Wettstein eds. 1982), discussed in A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 203 n.4. 
31 Confusion persists because the duress determination is not simply a factual or empirical 
question in all cases. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 31 (suggesting that volitional! 
constrained choice duress cases are "at least partially moralized" and not purely "empirical" ); 
see also Westen, supra note 2, at 544 ('''Justice' and 'duress' . .. are normative by definition."). 
Because the test is not purely empirical, it cannot be administered mechanically and is subject 
to uncertain manipulation based upon social norms. 
Confusion in the duress case law also exists because "coercion is a single concept that is 
sufficiently open-textured to encompass a range of diverse and mutually inconsistent norms," 
id. at 547, and can be used "to advance normatively inconsistent positions." Id. at 548. The 
conflict in norms is something that plagues contract law adjudication in all contexts. See Gordon, 
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1025 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon, Historicism] 
(noting the failure of thinking that purports to use "suprahistorical norms transcending time 
and space" to decide conflicts between competing norms); see also Feinman, Critical Approaches, 
supra note 5, at 834 n.19 (discussing the level at which various scholars would interject social 
policy judgments into their systems) . But see Hillman, supra note 3, at 104 (suggesting conflicting 
values can be and are accommodated within one system with the "freedom of contract and 
other principles shar[ing] the spotlight"). For another insight into the reason for the confusion, 
see Ogilvie, Economic Duress, Inequality of Bargaining Power and Threatened Breach of Contract, 
26 MCGILL L.J. 289, 289 (1981) (discussing the fact that "[n]o clear formulation of an underlying 
rationale of 'economic duress' or its necessary elements has appeared in the jurisprudence to 
date"). 
" See infra notes 61-62. 
33 Such a fact-finding approach is arguably an empirical one. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, 
at 7-8 (discussing empirical criteria) . 
... Because the actual intent of the party alleging duress cannot be known, the " inquiry 
therefore becomes indirect-we turn to objective evidence of the party's subjective intent." 
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focus not ori the promisor's free will but on whether the coercer's 
behavior violates moral norms (or a "moral baseline") .35 Morality­
based theories are unworkable because there exist many different 
potential baselines, but no clearly articulated factors to identify the 
appropriate one.36 In addition, morality-based theories require courts 
to answer questions in the abstract without regard to the actual social 
consequences of their decisions.37 The approach followed by the Res­
tatement (Second) of Contracts38 offers no better solution because its 
doctrinal elements are open-ended, ambiguous, and almost impossible 
to apply with any predictability.39 
Because the theories of coercion offer little help, courts manipulate 
the doctrinal elements, sometimes dispensing with or ignoring one or 
more of them.40 Courts conveniently attach a label to their conclusions 
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025. But this shifts the focus to the behavior of the other party and 
the empirical terms of the deal. [d . 
:Ie. For a discussion of moral baseline theory, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 206-214 
(reviewing aspects of Robert Nozick 's theory as elaborated in Nozick, supra note 8, at 440); 
Westen, supra note 2, at 572 (discussing baseline theory in relation to changes in conditions). 
36 Professor Wertheimer acknowledges that actually setting an appropriate moral baseline 
requires "nothing less than a complete moral and political theory." A. WERTHEIMER, supra 
note 2, at 217; see Uf. at 206-11 (illustrating the complexities and difficulties involved in 
establishing a baseline). Note that in spite of these complications, Wertheimer's argument 
incorporates a moral baseline. [d. at 267; see also Mather, supra note 3, at 615 ("tests [for 
coercion] fail to produce determinate results when moral coloration is not clear") . 
• 17 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 237 (taking the position that "'external' or policy 
considerations should have little bearing on the validity of a coercion claim") . Wertheimer 
thinks that the elements of coercion should be developed in the abstract and that policy 
considerations and consequences should not be determinative of the threshold question of 
whether duress exists. [d. 
J. The doctrinal tests for duress are outlined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 175-176 (1979). The core elements of the Restatement test include "improper threat" and 
"no reasonable alternative." [d. § 175; see infra note 108. 
39 The doctrinal tests for duress are not self-executing because the concept is "normative by 
definition . ... [D]enominating A's conduct toward B as 'duress' in some sense condemns A's 
conduct, because 'duress' is defined as a normatively illegitimate compulsion." Westen, supra 
note 2, at 544-45. The doctrinal formulation forces courts to grapple with normative questions 
that are difficult to resolve. 
' 0 For a general discussion of the manipulability of doctrinal elements in contract law, see 
Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1025 (" [S]upposedly purely technical schemes of offer­
and-acceptance rules, for instance, [have been] shown to be indefinitely manipulable in theory 
to reach the results of 'contract formed' or 'no contract formed' in any particular case . . . . "). 
See also Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at 834 (recognizing the inevitable impact 
of policy judgments on legal outcomes) . 
The general manipulability of doctrinal elements is reflected in the duress case law. Courts 
have, for example, inconsistently applied the "no reasonable alternative" prong of the Restatement 
approach. See supra note 38; infra note 108. In some instances, courts interpreting this doctrinal 
requirement have required that a party seeking avoidance rights on the ground of duress pursue 
legal remedies as a precondition to a successful recovery under duress; in other instances they 
have not done so. For example, in London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. 
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based on the presence or absence of thestr elements without explaining 
why they have reached different conclusions using the same doctrinal 
Rptr. 262 (1965), a developer pursued a subdivision development and attempted to acquire the 
defendant's land. Id. at 235, 44 CaL Rptr. at 263. At a critical stage in the developer's (plaintiff's 
predecessors) efforts, the defendant demanded money in excess of the agreed upon contract 
price for a land tract. Id. at 236, 44 CaL Rptr. at 264. Because a substantial delay would have 
imperiled development plans, the developer acquiesced. Id. at 237, 44 CaL Rptr. at 264. The 
court rejected a duress claim on those facts, finding the failure to pursue legal relief a business 
decision. Id. at 239, 44 CaL Rptr. at 265-66; see also Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 
(1888), quoted in Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure II, 20 N.C.L. REV. 341, 342 (1942) 
[hereinafter Dalzell, Duress II] (finding in the case "no discussion of the remedies that might 
be available"); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. lOll, 1015, 453 A.2d 1276, 
1278 (1982) (plaintiff's settlement agreement was not involuntary when plaintiff chose to settle 
rather than pursue available legal relieO. 
The court in Scutti v. State Road Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) took a 
different approach, calling an alternative that required the victim to suffer economic losses 
impracticable. In Scutti, when the developers applied for an occupancy permit for a building, 
the county denied the request, falsely alleging violations of setback requirements. [d. at 629. 
The developers acquiesced in an unfavorable waiver that the state later used to argue a limitation 
on potential damages from a subsequent condemnation of the developer's property. [d. In 
deciding whether duress was exerted by the county, the court readily recognized that the 
developers "could have engaged in litigation." [d. But the court found duress in view of the 
fact that pursuit of a legal remedy would have subjected the builders "to a substantial legal 
liability to their tenant for inability to deliver possession." Id.; see also Manufacturers Am. 
Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (third-party plaintiff sued bank for 
duress even though no evidence was offered that such plaintiff first sought legal relief from 
improper demand); Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 814-16, 374 N.W.2d 2, 7­
8 (1985) (parents who transferred life savings and property to a bank to avoid prosecution of 
their son permitted to claim duress despite not having sought legal redress); McCubbin v. Buss, 
180 Neb. 624, 629, 144 N.W.2d 175, 179 (1966) (employee threatened with termination unless 
he gave up stock option rights did not seek legal redress as a precondition to a duress action, 
yet the court found that "evidence of business coercion is clear and convincing"); S.S. & O. 
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 386, 301 A.2d 738, 747-48 (1973) 
(upon a showing of "'business complusion,''' claimant was entitled to seek a judicial remedy 
despite a contractual agreement waiving any claim of coercion and despite absence of a showing 
that duress claimant sought a judicial remedy in response to authority's demand for improper 
sewerage connection charges); Peter Matthews, Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 943, 
944, 499 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs had no "practical alternative" to 
succumbing to moving company's demand for liability limitation despite not having sought a 
prior judicial remedy); Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 A.D.2d 83, 90, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698, 
702 (1980) (permitting the seller of a home who paid a mortgage recording tax that a bank 
was required by law to pay, to bring action for restitution on the ground of duress despite the 
fact that the seller did not seek prior judicial redress on finding that "no realistic alternative" 
existed); Peters, Ricker & Co. v. Railroad Co., 42 Ohio St. 275, 285 (1884) (no showing by 
duress claimant of an effort to secure a legal remedy to force carrier to transport goods at 
required rates, because resort to the courts would not be adequate to save the business), cited 
in Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 245-46. A review of the cases cited above reveals that in 
some instances the courts do not even discuss the legal redress issue; in other instances, the 
court confronts the issue, but differs on the threshold showing of the impracticability of the 
legal remedy. Sometimes, the court equates the failure to pursue an available legal remedy with 
the taking of a business risk for which the "victim" should not be offered relief. 
The differing results in these cases demonstrates the manipulability of the standards governing 
the reasonableness of alternatives in a duress claim. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1034. Despite 
595 1989] 	 Duress Policy Guide 
elements m factually similar cases. 
Traditional coercion theories and elements are simply inadequate 
as an exclusive focus of analysis in duress cases. This Article does 
not propose a new theory of duress. Instead, it suggests a refinement 
of doctrine in which the courts candidly articulate certain key policy 
goals and develop elements based on them. These policy goals include 
efficiency, disclosure of unexpected risks, judicial capability, reliance, 
and economic incentives. If decisionmakers adopted the policy analyses 
suggested here, the predictability of judicial decision making would be 
enhanced and a supplemental analysis would be available when the 
doctrinal elements become difficult to apply.41 Moreover, this approach 
would preserve limited judicial resources, contribute to the efficient 
prevention of resource misallocation,42 reduce judicial capability prob­
lems,43 discourage one party from speculating at the expense of an­
other,44 provide incentives for economic industriousness,45 and dis­
courage economic negligence.46 
Part I of this Article has suggested that these policy factors should 
the fact that the "'reasonable alternatives' [test I has a reassuringly rational and objective ring," 
W. at 1033, it is difficult to apply with predictable results. The differing approaches to the 
question of the necessity of pursuing legal relief may depend on a court's view of whether the 
legal remedy is an adequate or impracticable remedy, either because of the delay it will cause 
or the inadequacy of the damages available. See Dalzell, Duress II, supra, at 378-82 (discussing 
when a legal remedy may be inadequate). 
For a different twist on the manipulability of the reasonable alternative prong of duress, see 
First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708, 715 (2d Cir. 1976) (" 'no reasonable 
alternative'" to fee settlement existed when lawyer refused to turn over corporate papers necessary 
to effectuate the closing of an asset purchase, when a lack of papers could have subjected 
stockholders to a breach action by the purchaser of the assets). On the other hand, courts have 
held that the mere failure to obtain the satisfaction of a "hope of obtaining a gain" should not 
qualify for duress relief. See, e.g., Pope v. Ziegler, 127 Wis. 2d 56, 60, 377 N.W.2d 201 , 203 
(Ct. App. 1985). 
Because the determination of whether the remedy is "reasonable" or "adequate" depends on 
apparently differing judicial views of how much economic loss the duress claimant should suffer 
before being able to claim duress, the doctrinal element of a "reasonable alternative" is infinitely 
manipulable. Consequently, a different approach should be adopted. Resolution in all of these 
cases should depend not on what ecg nomic losses a particular court thinks a duress victim 
should be required to assume (because there seems to be no agreement on what loss is enough 
to warrant relief other than bankruptcy, which is clearly enough) but on the basis of a systematic 
analysis of what policy concerns would be advanced or hindered by a finding of duress. 
jJ In addition, the policies enumerated here may simply help to rationalize results in existing 
case law . 
.. See infra text accompanying notes 162-249. 
43 Judicial capability problems are discussed generally in R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM 
IN CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1978). See infra notes 304-21 and accompanying text (examining judicial 
capability in the context 	of duress cases) . 
.. See infra text accompanying notes 322-4l. 
4S See infra text accompanying notes 360-75 . 
•• See infra text accompanying notes 376-85. 
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be considered by courts deciding duress cases and that the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts comments should be expanded to expressly 
account for them. Part II will demonstrate that the current analysis 
of duress claims leads to a morass of inconsistent and unpredictable 
results. It will explore both the inability of theoretical approaches to 
resolve these ambiguities in case law, and question their value as 
standards for assessing the coerciveness of proposals.47 This explo­
ration will underscore the need for a more policy-oriented approach. 
Part III of this Article suggests several policy factors that should be 
used to supplement the Restatement's doctrinal approach to deciding 
duress claims, and documents the advantages of adopting these policies 
in approaching duress claims.4R 
II. THE MORASS OF CASE LAW-CURRENT ApPROACHES TO 

RESOLVING THE "HARD CASES"49 

A. The Problem of Indeterminacy 
The absence of clearly articulated guidelines undermines consistency 
and predictability in the use of the doctrinal elements of duress. 
Courts often reach inconsistent results on similar facts by manipu­
lating the doctrinal elements of duress. Courts do not agree, for 
example, on when a creditor's offer of a reduced settlement posing 
"See infra text accompanying notes 49-107 . 
•• See infra text accompanying notes 120-385. Professor Whitford, commenting on a draft of 
this Article, pointed out that the distinction drawn between policy and doctrine in this Article 
may be too clear cut. Most doctrines, after all, have some underlying policy rationales. "A well 
stated doctrine becomes just an efficient way for testing whether a policy objective will be served 
by a particular result." Letter from William C. Whitford to Juliet P . Kostritsky (Feb. 4, 1989). 
Conceived in this way and accepting the usual coalescence between underlying policies and 
doctrine, the duress doctrinal formulation can be conceptualized as oriented towards achieving 
the dual policy objectives of voluntarism and fairness. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1032-36. 
Thus, in one sense, this Article is merely suggesting different policy considerations from those 
currently reflected in the doctrinal formulation. In another sense, however, because the current 
doctrinal formulation is so ambiguous, manipulable, and oriented to admittedly amorphous 
concepts, the manipulation of results does not seem to constitute an efficient resolution of the 
defined policy objectives. The doctrinal formulation of duress seems divorced from policy 
objectives and the elements merely become labels that courts attach to justify their conclusion 
on the duress claim. Thus, the distinction between doctrinal formulation and policy concerns 
remains viable. 
<9 See generally Murphy, supra note 7 (reexamining the concept of hard choices). The hard 
cases referred to are those in which one party is presented with two unpalatable choices. See 
supra note 9 (discussing biconditional and constrained choices). 
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economic hardship for the debtor qualifies as actionable duress.5o They 
differ on when a threat is improper or wrongful, and when a threat 
to exercise a legal right insulates one from a charge of wrongful 
action and therefore a finding of duress. Some courts hold that no 
wrongful threat can exist when the action threatened lies within one's 
legal rights,5l while other courts are willing to find duress even when 
the act threatened is entirely lawful standing alone.52 No consensus 
exists on what constitutes a "reasonable alternative" to an allegedly 
coercive offer such that it will preclude a finding of duress.53 Some 
courts require a duress claimant to demonstrate unsuccessful prior 
attempts to settle the dispute through legal means; others omit that 
requirement.54 Courts have encountered difficulties in determining 
what constitutes tolerable "hard bargaining" as opposed to imper­
missible duress.55 Finally, courts disagree on when the financial ne­
cessities realistically constraining a duress claimant's options should 
be attributed to the defendant's (putative coercer's) conduct. Appar­
ently, they agree on the principle that "[t]he mere stress of business 
conditions will not constitute duress when the defendant was not 
responsible for the conditions,"56 but disagree on when the coercer 
'" Compare Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 584 P.2d 15 
(Alaska 1978) (offer of $97,500 on $260-300,000 debt was coercive when debtor knew creditor 
faced impending bankruptcy) with Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 
1983) (general contractor's offer to pay $67,000 of the $120,000 extra costs of completion was 
not coercive under Wisconsin law despite subcontractor's financial difficulties) and Hackley v. 
Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N.W. 511, 514 (1881) (refusal to pay more than $4,000 on a 
claimed debt of $6,200 was not duress, though debtor might be financially ruined if he failed 
to obtain the full amount). 
' 01 E.g., Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (no actionable 
duress found when an employer threatened to fire an employee unless he accepted a severance 
settlement because there was "00 wrongful conduct"; employer was within his legal rights in 
threating termination); Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986) (court found evidence "sufficient to submit" a duress claim even though it was not 
unlawful for the bank to request that the makers sign a promissory note). 
52 E .g., McCubbin v. Buss, 180 Neb. 624, 629, 144 N.W.2d 175, 179 (1966) (evidence of duress 
was "clear and convincing" when an employer threatened to fire an employee unless the employee 
ceded valuable stock option rights, even though the employer acted within his legal rights since 
employment was terminable at will). The differing results in the cases, see cases cited supra 
notes 50 and 51, suggest that it is erroneous to assert that duress claims will be unsuccessful 
when a party threatens to do that which it has a legal right to do. E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 6, § 4.17, at 259. 
63 For an extended discussion of the manipulability of the reasonable alternative element of 
duress, see supra note 40. 
"See, e.g., Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888); see infra text accompanying notes 
284-95 (discussing Adams). 
"E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.17, at 262-64. Professor Farnsworth does not seek to 
discourage "hard bargaining between experienced adversaries," but characterizes contracts made 
by "a threat to exercise a power for illegitimate ends" as suspect. [d. at 263. 
56 See Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F .2d 1037, 1042 (Ct. CI. 1976); see 
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is sufficiently responsible for the victim's economic straits for the 
claim to be actionableY 
In order to sort out the morass of results and provide an overall 
theory useful for determining the particular circumstances that justify 
avoidance of contractual responsibility, courts and commentators have 
developed two types of economic coercion theory:58 "empirical"59 and 
"morality-based."60 The will theory of coercion,61 once the dominant 
also W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) (holding 
that plaintiff must show that "the duress resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive 
conduct and not by plaintiff's necessities"). 
"' See infra notes 189·90 and accompanying text. 
,-,s This discussion proceeds on the assumption that theories of economic coercion are to be 
assessed by Professor Barnett's evaluative criteria. These "criteria for comparing theories include 
at least three factors: (a) the number of known problems the theory handles as well or better 
than its rivals, (b) the centrality of the problems that the theory handles well, and (c) the 
promise that the theory offers for solving future problems." Barnett, supra note 1, at 270; cf. 
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 
1035 (1978) (discussing components of explanatory legal theory). 
", Wertheimer sets up this distinction between empirical and value-laden choices. A. WERTH. 
EIMER, supra note 2, at 53. 
'" Wertheimer posits that the modern law of duress, as reflected in both the "choice" prong 
(no reasonable alternative) and the "proposal" prong (improper threat), is infused with moralized 
judgments. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 53; see aLso Dalton, supra note 3, at 1032-36 
(discussing the moralized "substantive fairness" aspects of duress); Fingarette, supra note 6, at 
81-82 (asserting that the effort to determine whether real choice or reasonable choice exists 
requires resort to "legal norm"); Murphy, supra note 7, at 86-87 (underscoring moral choices 
at issue in finding duress). 
Professor Dalton notes these value-laden aspects of deciding duress cases when she states: 
"The line-drawing exercise actually took the form of distmguishing between unacceptable and 
acceptable behavior by the favored party, although this focus was not made explicit." Dalton, 
supra note 3, at 1027. 
6 1 "Will theories maintain that commitments are enforceable because the promisor has 'willed' 
or chosen to be bound by his commitment." Barnett, supra note 1, at 272. The justification 
for basing enforceability on an inquiry into the will was that" 'the will is something inherently 
worthy of respect.'" [d. (quoting Cohen, supra note 1, at 575). In the duress context, the will 
theory suggests that courts will find agreements to be unenforceable if the alleged victim 
acquiesced against her will. 
Critics fault the will theory on several grounds. First, because it is often difficult to ascertain 
the actual intent of a party, the approach may be impractical. [d.; see aLso Dalton, supra note 
3, at 1025 (asserting that an approach based on will theory is "rendered unworkable by the 
problem of knowledge. We cannot directly know or ascertain the subjective intent of the disfavored 
party.") The will theory also is deficient because it fails to explain case law which makes 
manifested intent, rather than actual intent, determinative of contract liability. See RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1979) (defining promise in terms of "manifestation of 
intention"). The emphasis on manifested intent in contract law undermines the importance of 
inner will. Under the manifested intent test, a promisor cannot escape contract liability by 
alleging that enforcement will violate her true will ; if she has led another person reasonably to 
expect a commitment, she will be bound. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods 
Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777 (1907). For a discussion of the significance of the manifest 
intent principle and the objectification of the will, see Dalton, supra note 3, at 1039-1046. 
Finally, courts and commentators have rejected the will theory on normative grounds because 
599 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
theory for deciding enforceability questions in this and other areas 
of contract law, is considered empirica1.62 A morality-based theory of 
coercion, which rejects value-neutral decisionmaking as an impossi­
bility, looks to standards of fairness, distributional concerns,63 and 
other "moral baselines"64 to decide whether agreements are coerced. 
B. Theories for Resolving the Indeterminacy Problem 
1. Will Theory: The Paradigm of the Overborne Wi1l65 
Will theory focuses on whether the promisor who acquiesces in an 
agreement has actually consented to the demand, and thus should 
be bound, or whether the agreement is voidable because the promisee's 
coercion has overborne the promisor's wil1.66 The theory's focus on 
the displacement of the individual will implies a psychological test6? 
to determine whether "[a] psychic capacity has been seriously dis-
of the potential threat its adoption would pose for contractual certainty and planning. See, e.g., 
Barnett, supra note 1, at 273 & n.ll (recognizing that relying on subjective evidence of actual 
intent "might create a de facto option in the promisor") . As David Hume has said: "'If the 
secret direction of the intention . . . could invalidate a contract, where is our security?'" Id. 
at 273 n.10 (quoting D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 30 n.5 
(C. Hendel ed. 1957) (1st ed. 1751)). For a discussion of the shift from the subjective to the 
objective theory of contract law and its implications for a responsibility (tort) model of contract 
obligation, see Dalton, supra note 3, at 1042-65. See a/$o supra note 20 (discussing defects in 
will theory). 
62 The will theory was considered empirical when courts and commentators, committed to the 
principle of voluntarism and consensual exchange, see supra note 5, believed that they could 
and should ascertain the free will of the parties. In part, the ease with which they decided free 
will questions on empirical grounds depended on their disregard of actual disparities which 
might have affected the freedom of the parties. See supra note 3. 
63 For a prime example of the view that distributional concerns are an important factor in 
duress outcomes, see the discussion of Professor Dawson's article supra in the text accompanying 
notes 21-26. But see infra note 162 (explaining why distributional motives do not completely 
explain duress case law outcomes). _. 
.. For a discussion of "moral" and "nonmoral" baselines, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, 
at 206-11. See a/$o infra text accompanying notes 88-107 . 
.., See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 71 -82 (discussing the inadequacy of overborne will theory 
both as an explanation of case law results, and as a normative standard, and instead advocating 
an approach based on fairness) . 
66 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1027; Dawson, supra note 3, at 263; see, e.g., Rubenstein v. 
Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 372, 120 A.2d 11, 17 (1956) (in deciding the validity of a conveyance 
attacked on duress grounds the court found a "prima facie showing here of a compulsive yielding 
to the demand for the conveyances, rather than the volitional act of a free mind"); see a/$o 
cases cited supra note 20. 
67 See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72; see a/$o Rubenstein, 20 N.J. at 371, 120 A.2d at 16 
(suggesting an analysis of duress based on psychological factors) . 
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abled,"68 and whether so much pressure has been applied as to impair 
the victim's ability to choose rationally and to act willingly.69 
The test for duress based on the will theory illustrates the impor­
tance of autonomy principles in nineteenth-century contract law.70 
The exception for agreements made in the absence of an assertion 
of free will "seemed appropriate, even necessary, to nineteenth century 
will theorists, who believed that enforcement of contracts was all 
about implementing the free wills of the parties."7! 
Courts deciding duress cases still rationalize the denial of enforce­
ment by principles of consent. Thus, the test is whether the threat 
has overborne a person's free will.72 Problems with the will theory, 
however, undermine its usefulness as an appropriate standard for 
deciding future cases.7~ The will theory is defective because it is based 
on a false central issue. It focuses on the "reality" of the victim's 
consent. 74 In fact, if one takes account of the real will of the party 
in individual duress cases, one concludes that in most cases the victim 
often eagerly and rationally chooses one option to avoid a less desirable 
alternative. 75 In these cases, there is no problem with '''volitional 
'" Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72. 
69Id. at 75-76, 87-88. 
70 The centrality of the autonomy principle in nineteenth-century contract law is undisputed. 
See, e.g. , Dalton, supra note 3, at 1012; Dawson, supra note 3, at 256 (discussing the introduction 
of the concept of free will into economic duress analysis); Mensch, Freedom of Contract as 
ldeowgy (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 758-59 (1981) (positing the voluntary exchange 
of promises as one of the main tenets of the classical model of contract law); Metzger & Phillips, 
supra note 3, at 475-78 (discussing the importance of individual freedom of will to classical 
contract law). For a discussion of the changing role of the autonomy principle and its role in 
contract law and jurisprudence, see supra note 5. 
7! Dalton, supra note 3, at 1027. 
7' See supra note 20. 
73 C{. Barnett, supra note 1, at 285-86 (discussing the defects of normative standards). 
7< Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 238; see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025 ("One approach 
is to focus on the disfavored party, and ask whether that party's assent to the transaction was 
genuine."). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts still focuses on the reality of assent. Section 
175 comment c provides: "A party's manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress 
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent. . . . The test is subjective and 
the question is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be 
the victim of duress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment c (1979). 
75 "[I]t is further plain that the more unpleasant the prospective alternative, the more genuine 
is the consent to the contract necessary to escape that alternative; in other words, that the 
consent to a contract resulting from duress is probably far more real than the typical contractual 
consent." Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 240; see also Atiyah, supra note 20, at 200 (explaining 
that "the more extreme the pressure, the more real is the consent of the victim"); Philips, 
supra note 4, at 133-34 (1984) ("A coerced agent is presented with unwanted, unpleasant 
alternatives, but is free to choose and to act upon the least obnoxious of them."). 
[A] victim of coercion may deliberate and choose how to act, and may continuously act 
intentionally and purposefully-as an intelligent agent of the coercer-in order to keep 
conduct in accord with the current demands of the coercer. All this establishes in fact what 
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capacity,' the kind of thing plainly suggested by the idiom of the 
broken wi11."76 In fact, when the victim "must choose between payment 
and tragedy, [her] choice is certainly an expression of the most 
genuine, heartfelt consent-and often a very happy consent indeed."77 
Thus, because the consent given may be very real, it is inappropriate 
to decide cases on the basis of whether the agreement represents an 
overborne or "destroyed" wilpB The will theory focuses on an event, 
the total destruction of the will, that is unlikely to occur except in 
rare cases in which the victim becomes a "mere mechanical instru­
ment."79 Thus, the test is not likely to be useful in differentiating 
valid from invalid agreements in the vast majority of cases.BO 
The will theory, moreover, is an inherently unworkable normative 
standard for determining if a duress defense should succeed. First, 
because "[w]e cannot directly know or ascertain the subjective intent 
of the disfavored party"BJ the approach is difficult to apply.B2 Second, 
the overborne will approach relegates decisionmaking on the grounds 
of whether the "coercer's" behavior is somehow acceptable or un­
acceptable to underground status and thus deflects attention from 
important policy matters.~3 
The overborne will theory mistakenly assumes that parties to con­
tracts normally have unrestrained freedom and unlimited choice.B4 
Yet, because freedom is a relative matter and "a will exercises its 
freedom only in selecting one of several possible courses of action,"85 
is incompatible with the meaning of the legal concept of 'unwilled behavior.' 
Fingarette, supra note 6, at 73-74. 
76 Fingarette, supra note 6, at 75. 
77 Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 238. 
78 Not only does the focus seem inappropriate because it fails to correspond with the reality 
of the cases, but it is misguided as a normative standard because it neglects important policy 
considerations. See infra Part III. 
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 comment a (1979). For a discussion of such 
nonvolitional acts, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9. 
80 See supra note 9 for examples of "biconditional" or "constrained" choices in which the 
actor's will is real but her choice is !Jevertheless clearly coerced. 
81 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025. 
82 Professor Fingarette examines how focusing on the fairness of the choice might aid in 
determining whether the choice was coerced. Fingarette, supra note 6, at 79-82 . 
.., Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025-32; see also supra note 20 (documenting defects in will theory). 
Courts and commentators have been reluctant to accept the centrality of policy issues in 
decisions regarding duress. According to Dalton, even Professor Dawson was reluctant to 
"reformulate duress doctrine around the hitherto buried standard of bad behavior." Dalton, 
supra note 3, at 1030. Instead, he focused on the impairment of bargaining power as a justification 
for intervention, thereby "commit[ting] Dawson to replicating the underlying structure of the 
formalist duress doctrine." Id. at 1031. 
.. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239. 
B:, Id. 
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an approach based on whether the agreement is the product of free 
will or not, as alternative absolute choices, is not likely to yield 
sensible results. If all choice is constrained in some way,86 then a 
duress approach based on absolute free will would make all contracts 
voidable for duress. The free will theory is thus unable to distinguish 
between enforceable and unenforceable agreements. The relevant ques­
tion should be a normative one: Under what circumstances should 
the agreement be enforced? When is a lack of choice available to 
the promisor so compelling that enforcement should be withheld?87 
That normative decision should not be based on the elusive concept 
of free will. 
2. Normative Theories:88 The "Moral Baseline" Approach89 
Defects in the will theory and its debunking in the literature90 
86 Id. 
87 According to Wertheimer, " [wJe always choose from among a limited set of options. 
Nonetheless, some sets of options are more constrained than others, and it is these relatively 
highly constrained choice situations that I have in mind." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 
10. The lack of any choice available to the promisor (coercee) emphasizes the need for promisee 
(coercer) to exercise restraint. Another approach would focus on whether the promisee (the 
coercer) has a property right in the threatened alternative. That property right question would 
be solved by reference to social objectives such as identifying and enforcing property rights in 
order to foster optimal allocation of resources to production. See Conybeare, The Private and 
Socwl Utility of Extortian, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1028, 1029-30 (1981) (examining the use of social 
objectives to determine the legality of acts of extortion); Demsetz, On Extortian: A Reply, 68 
AM. E CON. REV. 417, 418 (1978) (examining the social utility of "wealth transfer" and focusing 
on the legal system's method of "alter[ingJ the definition of property rights"). 
88 Professor Barnett would classify normative or standards-based theories as "those which 
evaluate the substance of a contractual transaction to see if it conforms to a standard of 
evaluation that the theory specifies as primary." Barnett, supra note J, at 277. Because the 
approach to duress based on normative standards "embod[iesJ an assumption that we can 
distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable; the attempt to make this distinction throws 
us directly into the problem of power[:] . . . the power of the state to control private arrangements 
and to evaluate private power relations." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025-26. The reluctance to 
admit a public role in private contractual arrangement derives from a continued attachment to 
the notion that courts can act as value-neutral facilitators of the choices of private parties, 
thereby protecting the "vaunted neutrality of the state as enforcer of the will of the parties." 
[d. at 1029. The reluctance to admit a public role for contract law has prompted commentators 
and courts to manufacture a variety of techniques designed to suppress the public aspect of 
duress. S ee, e.g., id. at 1026-27; Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1024-25 (describing 
systems of legal thought in which "denial that particular contexts of time and place are relevant 
to the enterprise of legal rationalization" (emphasis removed». All legal rules are in some sense 
government interventions and therefore can be considered "public." Simply providing a claim 
for damages for breach of an express contract would be a "public" act in this context. 
Other normative theories for deciding duress claims not discussed in the text include Professor 
Mather's "matrix for harmful modifications." Mather, supra note 3, at 632. Mather's framework 
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prompted some commentators to offer a second theory of coercion­
one based on normative standards. Morality-based theory permits the 
substantive review of an agreement to determine whether it comports 
with relevant moral or societal norms of fairness and cooperation.91 
If the agreement does not satisfy such standards, then it should be 
voidable for duress. 
The morality-based approach to differentiating coercive from non­
coercive proposals defines coercion as a worsening of the victim's 
position when measured against some baseline or other frame of 
reference.92 As Professor Wertheimer explains, "A makes a threat 
when, if B does not accept A's proposal, B will be worse off than in 
the relevant baseline position."93 The appropriate question to ask 
under a moral baseline standard94 is whether the threat "is a con-
does not provide a wholly satisfactory approach. First, Professor Mather's discussion of the 
"sympathetic amendment" identifies a reduction in social gain from the amount anticipated as 
a reason to make a buyer share the seller's anticipated loss without providing a justification 
for tbat loss sharing. Id. at 632-34. Although a seller's reduced profit may be troubling, it is 
not clear why that fact alone justifies the buyer in bearing that cost "to relieve [the] [s]eller 
from bearing the entire burden." Id. at 633. Second, in some ways the test would be overly 
restrictive in judging the propriety of amendments. Mather would reject as coercive what he 
calls a "holdup amendment," id. at 636-37, ignoring the hidden costs to society of nonenforcement. 
Because the suggested amendment may not be palpably unfair, it may be costly to alert potential 
coercers to the involuntariness of the transaction. See infra text accompanying notes 162-99. 
89 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 206-11 (describing "moral"and "nonmoral" baselines as 
defined by Nozick, supra note 8, at 440). 
90 See Atiyah, supra note 20; Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4; Dawson, supra note 3. 
91 See Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at 843. 
92 See Westen, supra note 2, at 573 (finding a particular "proposal can thus be characterized 
accurately as either a threat or an offer, depending on which baseline one stipulates"). Baselines 
help to bring meaning to the distinction between offers of rewards, which are often regarded 
as noncoercive, and threats of burdens, which are deemed coercive. Id. at 571-72. Unless we 
are to regard these terms as merely "semantic," id. at 574 n.107 (citing Farnsworth, Coercion 
in Contract Law, 5 · U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329, 332-33 (1982», one must decide on a 
baseline against which to measure the proposal; otherwise, one will not be able to decide whether 
it threatens the victim with a penalty or offers the recipient a reward. Id. at 572. 
93 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 204. If duress is conceptualized in this way, then proposals 
in the form of amendments to improve the recipient's position are not coercive even if refusal 
of the offer would leave the recipient in · a worse position: "If the amendment makes B better 
off than the original terms, not merely as well off, her assent to the amendment has obviously 
not been coerced because it was not the result of the threat." Mather, supra note 3, at 625 
n.34. 
9. Commentators have suggested standards other than a moral standard to establish baselines. 
For example, Wertheimer describes a predictive, or statistical test, A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 
2, at 207-211, and Westen describes a preference standard. Westen, supra note 2, at 577-78. 
The predictive test measures proposals against "what is 'normal' in .. . society." A. WERTH· 
EIMER, supra note 2, at 207. If the proposal would make the recipient better off than would 
otherwise normally be the case based on predictions about how people are likely to act, a court 
would find no coercion. Id. The preference standard looks at what the recipient of the proposal 
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ditional promise to leave the recipient worse off than he ought to be 
left under the circumstances."95 
The moral baseline theory suffers from defects that inhere in any 
normative standard.96 One major obstacle to consistent application of 
this theory is that agreement on the standards for judging the morality 
of a proposal may be impossible to reach.97 Such a determination 
depends entirely on where one sets the baseline against which the 
acceptability of the threat is to be measured.98 Moreover, because 
there are many possible baselines and because moral baseline theory 
does not itself resolve where to set the baseline, many results seem 
plausible, although not compelled. Results in duress cases appear 
certain only when the baseline is indisputable. 
Wertheimer and others contrast the following two examples to 
highlight the fact that the application of an indisputable concept of 
moral obligation invites divergent results. In the first example, "A 
realizes that B is about to lose a large sum in the stock market. A 
tells B that he will help B avoid the loss if and only if B gives him 
15 percent of the amount he would have lost."99 In the second example, 
"A comes upon an auto wreck and an injured B on a desolate stretch 
of road. A tells B that he will call an ambulance if and only if B 
gives him $100."100 According to the analysis of several commentators, 
coercion does not exist in the stockmarket case because A is not 
required under a moral baseline approach to render his services for 
free. IOI Moral obligations, however, obligate A to call an ambulance, 
wanted. If the proposal violates that preference, it is coercive. Westen, supra note 2, at 577­
78. 
The interplay of all three baselines-moral, predictive, and preference-can be seen in the 
slave case example drawn by Professor Nozick. Nozick, supra note 8, at 450-51. If a slaveholder 
who regularly whips his slave, makes a proposal to stop whipping the slave if he will work for 
the owner on Sunday, but to continue whipping him if he does not work on Sunday, the 
propriety of the threat will be different when measured under the various baselines. See A. 
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 208-09. Under the predictive test, the slave expects regular 
beatings, and the proposal does not make the slave worse off than under an expected reality, 
and thus the proposal is an offer. Id. at 208. Under both the moral and preference baselines, 
the offer would be coercive. Under the moral baseline, since "[hJe ought to. occupy a position 
in which he is not regularly whipped for the sport of it ... the slaveholder is conditionally 
promising to leave [the slave] decidedly worse off." Westen, supra note 2, at 583-84. Under a 
preference test the proposal would be coercive for a slave who preferred not to be whipped and 
to maintain a Sunday holiday. 
9' Westen, supra note 2, at 576. 
96 Barnett, supra note I, at 285-86. 
97Id. 
98 See infra text accompanying notes 99-107. 
99 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 214 (providing an example drawn from Gunderson, Threats 
and Coercion, 	9 CAN. J . PHIL., 247, 258 (1979». 
HlO Id. 
IOIId. at 214-15 (discussing the views of Gunderson and Haksar). 
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thereby making his threat not to do so unless he is paid $100 
wrongful. I02 In these examples, the boundaries of conduct required 
under moral obligation theory seem self-evident. 
In other cases, however, the morality of the proposal is not as 
obvious. Morality is not a universal and self-evident concept but a 
debatable one susceptible to numerous subjective interpretations. 
Therefore, it is impossible to set a universally acceptable moral 
baseline against which to measure the coerciveness of a proposal; 
hence, the theory is inadequate as a vehicle for deciding cases. The 
problem of a multiplicity of moral baselines is illustrated by the 
following example, given by Professor Nozick. "A is B's normal 
supplier of illegal drugs for $20 per day. One day, A proposes to B 
that he will supply B's drugs if and only if B beats up C."103 Nozick 
finds A's proposal to be noncoercive because he concludes that moral 
obligation does not require A to be a drug supplier for B.104 But 
Wertheimer proposes that the analysis is "murkier" than at first 
appears if one admits that it is possible to find some moral obligation 
that would require A to continue to act as B's supplier. 105 
Because moral issues often present a murky quagmire,106 agreement 
on the propriety of a threat measured by a moral baseline may be 
difficult.107 To resolve ambiguities on the moral issue, courts and 
commentators should focus on the societal consequences of finding 
102 [d. 
103 [d. at 209 (providing an example drawn from Nozick, supra note 8, at 447). 
10. Nozick, supra note 8, at 447-48, 450-51; see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 209 
(interpreting Nozick's view). 
105 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 209 & n.27 (suggesting the possibility that "[e]ven if 
the drug relationship is immoral from an external perspective, it is arguable that within that 
relationship, A is morally required to continue to supply B with drugs"); see also Frankfurt, 
supra note 9, at 72 (discussing the relevance of a prior course of dealings in determining if a 
proposal is coercive or noncoercive). 
106 See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 229-33. Professor Wertheimer's discussion of 
the Lecherous Millionaire example, which is drawn from Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in 
PATERNALISM 208 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983), illustrates the deficiencies of a moral baseline analysis. 
In the example the millionaire offers a mother money to cover medical expenses to save her 
dying child if she will become the millionaire's mistress. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 229. 
If the rights-based (moral) baseline is accepted, then one would find the proposal to be noncoercive 
since the millionaire is not obligated to help. [d. at 231. An alternative analysis that focuses 
on the policy consequences of granting or denying relief should be factored into the debate on 
duress claims. Under this policy-based analysis, it may be that the societal consequence of 
denying the duress claim would be undesirable. A waste of resources might result if millionaires 
seek out desperate mothers secure in the expectation that courts will not void their contracts. 
See Daly & Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 997, 1001 (1975) 
(" [E]xtortion [could be] an extremely expensive method of allocating and distributing resources."); 
see also R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 174-76 (discussing the economics of rescue). 
107 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 53 (asserting that the test for duress based on the 
propriety of a threat is "moralized"). 
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duress. Otherwise, the dilemma will remain unsolved, with each side 
arguing that its position is morally compelled. Focusing on labeling 
the proposal as violative of some abstract moral baseline is unpro­
ductive because it diverts attention from what the result should be 
in light of underlying policy concerns. 
C. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Doctrinal Approach 
The main current doctrinal standard for deciding duress claims in 
contract cases-the Restatement (Second) of Contracts-provides no 
better guidance than the theoretical approaches explored in Part II. 
The Restatement tests are so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless 
and therefore easily manipulable by courts. 
The first prong of the Restatement's contract duress defense is 
partly normative. Section 175(1) would render a contract voidable by 
the victim if the "manifestation of assent is induced by an improper 
threat."!08 Section 176 of the Restatement goes on to define improper 
threat: 
(1) A threat is improper if 
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself 
would be a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property, 
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution, 
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the 
threat is made in bad faith, or 
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing under a contract with the recipient. 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair 
terms, and 
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would 
not significantly benefit the party making the threat, 
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation 
of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair d~aling by the 
party making the threat, or 
lOS RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979). The full text of § 175 reads as 
follows: 
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other 
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim. 
(2) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to the transaction, 
the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to the transaction in good 
faith and without reason to know of the duress either gives value or relies materially on 
the transaction. 
Id. 
607 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for ille­
gitimate ends. 109 
Thus, even if it is neither criminal nor tortious, the threat may 
still be improper if it "is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing under a contract,"110 or if, as a result of the threat, there is 
an "unfair exchange" and there has been either "prior unfair dealing" 
or "a use of power for illegitimate ends."I11 The standards for inter­
preting the impropriety of the threat are open -ended standards char­
acteristic of modern contract lawY2 Ultimately, these guidelines for 
judging improper threats fail to provide a satisfactory solution because 
they sidestep the very questions they raise. As Professor Dalton 
queries, "What uses of power are illegitimate, what kinds of pressure 
are unfair, in the contractual context?"113 The Restatement itself does 
not provide clearly articulated standards for determining when an 
exchange is unfair or when there is unfair dealingY4 Consequently, 
courts manipulate these standards according to their own views of 
fairness in the particular case.l15 
The second prong of the doctrinal duress analysis also fails to 
provide adequate guidance to decisionmakers and suffers from the 
same open-endedness as the threat element. Section 175(1) turns on 
whether the party subjected to an improper threat had a "reasonable 
alternative" to acquiesence in the threatening party's proposal. 116 
Normative elements necessarily inhere in the determination of whether 
a given alternative course of action is reasonable or not.117 Courts 
manipulate this reasonableness criterion, sometimes holding for ex­
ample, that an available legal remedy, even if costly to the threatened 
party, is necessarily a reasonable alternative. At other times, courts 
dispense altogether with requiring the inability to resort to the law 
as a condition for a successful duress claim. 118 Courts also manipulate 
109 ld. § 176. 
1I°ld. § 176(1)(d). 
III ld. § 176(2)(b)-(c). 
"' Moreover, as Professor Dalton sUttes, "These [standards] raise the very questions they 
were supposed to answer." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1035. 
113Id. 
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 comments a-f (1979) (providing no 
definition for "unfair exchange" or "unfair dealing"). But see id. comment f (giving examples 
and commentary on these issues). 
116 See supra note 22. 
116 See supra note 108. 
117 The normative element is reflected in "[t]he 'objectivity' of the 'reasonable alternatives' 
standard." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1033. 
1\6 Court manipulation of the reasonable alternative prong of duress doctrine can be seen by 
examining case law. Compare London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 
262 (1965) (plaintiff voluntarily chose not to pursue a civil suit for damages and therefore a 
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the degree to which economic hardship may entitle a claimant to 
accede to the threat and forgo a financially ruinous alternative.1l9 
III. A SUGGESTED POLICY GUIDE FOR DECIDING DURESS CASES 
Because of the ambiguous and open-ended nature of doctrinal tests, 
courts inevitably encounter difficulties in applying them in a pre­
dictable and consistent fashion. This Article suggests that the courts 
should look to other, more clearly articulated, policies to assist them 
in deciding duress claims. Clarifying these policies will clarify appli­
cation of the elements of duress. 
A. Efficiency Concerns in the Duress Context 
An efficiency policy should be incorporated into the traditional 
doctrinal duress analysis. An efficiency standard normally seeks to 
evaluate various rules of law to determine if they permit individuals 
to maximize their individual welfare, and to make both parties to a 
transaction "better Off."120 An efficiency policy based on judicial econ­
omy,121 efficient prevention of resource misallocation,122 and/or efficient 
claim of duress was inappropriate) and King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. 
1011, 1015, 453 A.2d 1276, 1278 (1982) (plaintiff's claim that settlement was coerced by city 
water authority failed where plaintiff opted not to continue to pursue his legal remedy) with 
Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888) (court did not discuss pursuit of civil relief in 
deciding a duress claim), noted in Dalzell, Duress II, supra note 40, at 341-42 and S.S. & o. 
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (plaintiff 
permitted to prevail on a duress claim despite a failure to challenge the improper action of the 
coercer in court before acquiescing); see also cases cited supra note 40; Dalton, supra note 3, 
at 1033 n.126 & 1033-34 (discussing "the manipulability of the reasonable alternative standard"). 
119 See cases cited supra note 118. 
120 Economists conclude that welfare maximization for individuals will result in an aggregate 
increase in welfare for society as a whole. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979); Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1432, 1460-61, 1463-64 (1985). This Article focuses on efficiency not only at the micro­
individualized level, but also seeks to evaluate at the macro level whether certain results will 
be efficient in terms of saving judicial resources or expenses. These latter concerns do not fit 
neatly within the private welfare model. 
This Article goes beyond the two private parties to the exchange to promote the general 
social welfare. Thus, the test for the efficient allocation of judicial resources in the context of 
contractual duress, see infra text accompanying notes 126-46, should be considered part of a 
broader efficiency test. Although conservation of judicial resources is a pressing issue at the 
local level, it is rooted in broader economic policies. See infra note 127. 
12 1 See infra text accompanying notes 126-61. 

122 See infra text accompanying notes 162-248. 
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normative case outcomes,1 23 would provide a supplemental means of 
deciding duress claims. In addition, incorporation of efficiency policy 
concerns into duress analysis would provide a theoretical underpinning 
for the cases, explain and organize results,124 and thereby increase 
predictability in cases when doctrinal applications are otherwise un­
certain.125 
1. The Case for Explicit Consideration of the Judicial Economy 
Factor: A Useful Analysis When Doctrinal Ambiguities Exist 
a. Judicial Economy as an Efficiency Concern 
Courts should be reluctant to find duress if the result would produce 
needless delay and a waste of judicial resources. Judicial resources 
are wasted if a finding of duress will only prompt further actions in 
which the winner of the duress claim will inevitably lose on the 
ultimate substantive issue. The pattern of waste could occur in one 
of two ways. A prevailing duress claimant may prompt the coercer 
to institute a second action to vindicate her substantive rights. Al­
ternatively, the coercer may be able to vindicate her rights by taking 
unilateral action that will disadvantage the duress claimant. In either 
case, a finding of duress may promote a waste of judicial resources. 
If the duress victory prompts a second lawsuit by the coercer, and 
the duress claimant has a losing substantive claim, the duress finding 
will only temporarily advantage a party who will lose in the second 
lawsuit. A duress finding merely postpones loss by the duress claimant 
until the defeat on the merits in the second lawsuit. Thus, if a 
contract required B to furnish particular goods to A, a general con­
tractor, and if B refused to furnish those goods and did not agree to 
do so until A threatened to exercise its legal remedies (including 
hiring another party to do t"he work and charging B with the costs), 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 250-80. 
12< An efficiency theory can explain otherwise inexplicable variations in the case law and in 
this sense "seeks a scientific explanation for the welter of legal microdata, an explanation in 
the compound form of (1) a descriptive law that can order the data, organize them into an 
elegant, trenchant, parsimonious macropattem, and impart to them an 'implicit logic.'" Mich­
elman, supra note 58, at 1035. 
12', For examples illustrating the potential of an efficiency theory to resolve the outcome of a 
case whose resolution would be uncertain under a strict doctrinal analysis, see infra text 
accompanying notes 138-46. 
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B's claim of duress should be rejected. 126 If the court found duress, 
then A would be prompted to institute a suit to compel B to furnish 
the product required under the contract. A finding of duress would 
thus only temporarily advantage B and prompt a second wasteful 
lawsuit. 127 
A waste of judicial resources can also occur in situations in which 
the coercer may, despite a finding of duress, exercise unilateral power 
to vindicate her rights, thus rendering a judicial finding in the duress 
claimant's favor wasteful. Assume that an employer gives an employee 
at will the option of being fired or accepting a favorable severance 
package. The employee acquiesces in the severance pay and then 
challenges the agreement on duress grounds and seeks reinstate­
ment.128 If the court voids the agreement on duress grounds, then the 
employer may simply exercise its right to terminate the employee. 129 
Thus, by a duress finding, the employee gains no more than temporary 
126 This hypothetical is based on W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896 
(8th Cir. 1957). 
127 Although this hypothetical may be explained in terms of the wrongful act prong of the 
Restatement (most would agree that it is not wrongful to threaten to resort to one's legal 
remedies in order to pressure a non-performing party), the wrongfulness analysis may have 
limited usefulness in situations where agreed upon norms do not automatically resolve the 
wrongfulness issue. In these instances efficiency analysis may be useful. 
In its simplest form, efficiency focuses on achieving the greatest output with the least input. 
The conservation of judicial resources is a particularized, narrow type of efficiency that ties 
into broader economic justifications for duress. 
For example, imagine that A owes B money (the "associated claim") . Later, in response to 
a threat by B, A agrees to pay B the money owed (the "subsequent settlement deal"). If an 
inquiry into the merits of the associated claim reveals that the duress claimant has a losing 
claim and that the threatener would likely win, the duress claim should be denied. In this 
circumstance, any expenditure of resources by the threatener, including the resources devoted 
to the threat, will most likely be worth the present value of winning. On the other hand, if 
the duress claimant is likely to win on the associated claim, then any expenditure of resources 
by the threatener, including the resources devoted to the threat, will likely exceed the present 
value of winning. Thus, the threat is likely to have a negative value for the threatener. Courts 
should find duress in such cases. The economic justifications for duress can be viewed as part 
of the general economic justification for this type of result. 
When the threatener has a losing associated claim, the threat is arguably of "no benefit to 
the actor" in terms of "individual private utility," Conybeare, supra note 87, at 1029, and 
therefore the threat is extortionate. Extortion involves "an act which merely redistributes income 
and reduces social welfare by the amount of any transaction costs." [d. at 1028. Thus, judicial 
resources should be expended to undo such transactions. This would prevent the allocation of 
resources to such negative transactions. 
128 This hypothetical is based on Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987), although in that case the employee did not seek reinstatement. 
129 For a discussion of the traditional rule granting an employer the right to discharge employees 
at will unless the contract expressly provides for a specific duration, as well as an exploration 
of judicially created limitations on this doctrine, see Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At- WiU 
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdnwn of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 
(1986). 
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relief that will be eliminated once the employer exercises its termi­
nation rights. If the employer should subsequently fire the employee 
and the employee challenges the termination, the court would un­
doubtedly uphold the termination. 130 Thus, deciding the duress claim 
in favor of the employee initially would only buy time. Given the 
scarcity of judicial resources, it is wasteful to utilize them in this 
fashion. 
Of course, all settlements result in judicial economies. Because 
settlements avoid the necessity of judicial intervention on a disputed 
issue, they are favored creatures of the law. 131 The judicial economy 
suggested here is, however, different from that normally applicable 
with compromise agreements. In an ordinary compromise, judicial 
economy suggests that the agreement not be upset because of the 
judicial expenditure that would be entailed in doing so. This judicial 
economy is thought to override individual dissatisfaction with the 
settlement. The judicial economy identified here is even more com­
pelling. It suggests that settlements not be overturned when there is 
no chance that the party claiming relief ultimately will prevail. No 
compelling reason exists to upset the settlement because the claimant 
would ultimately lose on the merits. This may not be the case, however, 
when avoidance of the agreement will enable the allegedly coerced 
party to advance a winning claim. 
b. Application and Explanation 
Even if the judicial economy explanation is fortuitously consistent 
with case law results, the question of whether the approach is more 
useful than traditional doctrinal analysis or should merely be used 
to supplement such analysis remains open. In the two hypotheticals 
discussed above, the Restatement's doctrinal approach would inquire 
into whether the threat to resort to legal remedies or the threat of 
130 If there is no second lawsuit because the employee does not challenge the later termination, 
then one might legitimately inquire how one decision (no duress) conserves judicial resources 
more than another decision (duress) when judicial resources are used to decide only one case. 
Even in that instance, a finding of no duress could conserve judicial resources and be preferable 
to a finding of duress because it might discourage future lawsuits by similarly situated employees. 
131 See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying 
duress claim by citing "[t]he adverse effect on the finality of settlements and hence on the 
willingness of parties to settle their contract disputes without litigation" if settlements were 
voidable on the ground that one party had been financially desparate when the settlement was 
made); London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 241, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267 (1965) 
("If the courts should begin to encourage suits like this one, land deals would never be final 
in this country."). 
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immediate firing was improper.132 Because there may be general agree­
ment that these threats are not wrongful, the cases seem easy to 
resolve under the traditional wrongfulness rubric because conventional 
doctrine states that it is not duress to threaten to do what one has 
a legal right to do.l~3 Moreover, the employment hypothetical is a 
relatively simple case to resolve under a moral baseline approach. 134 
The employee is not entitled to continue in his employment at all; 
therefore, one could characterize the proposal for resignation with 
severance benefits as an offer rather than a coercive proposal. The 
proposal makes the employee "better off" than she would be if 
terminated with the possibility of not recovering any severence ben­
efits, and is therefore a noncoercive offer. 135 This would be true even 
if the employee preferred to continue on and receive her regular 
wages. Thus, a strict doctrinal analysis based either on wrongfulness 
or on a moral baseline seems adequate. 
Nevertheless, the judicial economy approach may prove useful in 
cases in which the doctrinal element of wrongfulness is not easy to 
apply and thus subject to manipulation. 136 Furthermore, the approach 
132 See supra note 38 (discussing the improper threat element) . 
133 But see supra note 52. 
13< See supra note 92. 
IC::, See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 215. 
136 The manipulability of the reasonable alternative prong of duress doctrine has already been 
addressed in supra notes 40 and 118. The manipulability of the wrongfulness component is 
evidenced by comparing the following cases; in each, the employer offered the employee a choice 
between two unpalatable alternatives. Although all the employers had a legal right to fire the 
employees, the courts reached differing conclusions as to whether the threat to terminate made 
the resulting agreement voidable for duress. Compare Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 
435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970) (threat to terminate employees at will if they did not agree to 
sell their stock to company officers deemed actionable on the issue of duress) arul Wise v. 
Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (threat to cause discharge of former 
employee from present employment and use of legal process to ruin him unless he released 
claim against former employer permits inference of duress) arul McCubbin v. Buss, 180 Neb. 
624, 144 N.W.2d 175 (1966) (threat to discharge employee if he did not agree to cancel stock 
purchase contract deemed wrongful and cancellation agreement may be rescinded) with Schmalz 
v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (not wrongful for employer to offer 
employee choice of resignation with reduced severance or termination) arul Fox v. Piercey, 119 
Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951) (not wrongful for employer to offer fireman option of resignation 
or termination). 
Some commentators have explained the variability in the case law results in terms of the 
presence of a threat made to extract a collateral benefit for the employer. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 6, § 4.17, at 261-62. Others would explain them in terms of an unjust benefit to 
the employer. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 282-88. This Article suggests that the variability 
in results may be explained in terms of efficiency. Efficiency policy concerns provide an 
explanation for these results that may be easier to apply than the slippery concepts of unjust 
enrichment or collateral benefits. The usefulness of the tests suggested here in resolving a wide 
range of factual situations, and the societal benefits in terms of conservation of judicial resources, 
prevention of resource misallocation, and encouragement of appropriate economic incentives, 
613 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
may enhance predictability when the coercer's action does not fall 
within the ambit of specifically protected contractual rights, but also 
does not explicitly violate tort or criminal law standards. The Res­
tatement tests for judging wrongfulness in the noncriminalfnontort 
context are based on normative ideas of unfair exchange and the 
illegitimate use of power. But they do not directly resolve how the 
issues of fairness and legitimacy should be solved. 137 In a case in 
which the "wrongfulness" of the action is problematic, the judicial 
economy analysis can facilitate appropriate case outcomes. 
Finserv Computer Corp. v. Bibliographic Retrieval Services 138 illus­
trates a case in which ambiguities concerning the "wrongfulness" of 
the coercer's actions should be supplemented by an efficient judicial 
resource allocation analysis. In Finserv, the defendant executed an 
agreement that "provided compensation to plaintiff for its assistance 
in the founding and financing of defendant." 139 The contract was 
entered into after the plaintiff had threatened to interfere with the 
defendant's funding arrangements and threatened to sully its presi­
dent's reputation by calling him a "welcher." 140 When defendant 
refused to honor the agreement, plaintiff sued. 141 
Finserv is a case in which the wrongfulness component of doctrinal 
duress analysis may be difficult to apply. Standing alone, the threats 
do not fit into predefined categories of tort or crime. Normative and 
suggest the adoption of efficiency policy guides in duress analysis. Duress avoidance may be 
available because such a result will increase efficiency. For example, in the McCubbin case, the 
duress avoidance may be available to encourage the disclosure of certain information in order 
that parties may bargain for mutual benefit. The employer who utilized the pressure of terminating 
the employee's job should have a duty to disclose that such pressure would be used before prior 
to the plaintiff's purchase of his stock because it would have affected the value of the stock 
purchase. Having failed to disclose that information, the employer should be prohibited from 
using the tactic. A duress finding will thus penalize the employer for failing to disclose the 
potential use of such tactics and encourage the disclosure of unexpected and collateral pressures 
so that bargaining to mutual advantage can occur. 
The employment cases provide good examples of situations in which the employer threatens 
to do that which he has a legal right to do: terminate an employee at will. Nevertheless, courts 
sometimes find the threat to be wron~l. Similarly, threating to sue in order to induce an 
agreement when the maker of the threat lacks a good faith basis for believing he has a cause 
of action is the type of bad faith that will make an agreement voidable. See A. WERTHEIMER, 
supra note 2, at 42. 
137 The ease of deciding cases involving a threat that is not independently wrongful is as 
mythical as the theoretical ease of deciding contract formation cases according to doctrinal 
tests. See Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1025-26; see also supra text accompanying 
note 112 . 
•
38 125 A.D.2d 765, 509 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1986) . 





1<, [d. at 765, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 188. The duress claim was raised by way of an affirmative 
defense. [d. 
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moral baseline approaches are difficult to apply to Finserv because 
of the difficulty of ascertaining whether the threat to call someone 
a welcher in these circumstances is morally objectionable or legally 
wrongful. 142 
Nonetheless, even if Finserv is difficult to decide under the wrong­
fulness element or moral baseline theories, the court should find no 
duress on judicial economy grounds. Finding duress would only tem­
porarily benefit the defendant and thus waste judicial resources. If 
the court granted the duress claim, the defendant could void the 
coerced agreement to pay the plaintiff. 143 The defendant, however, 
would still owe the plaintiff for services rendered and presumably the 
plaintiff could still recover on a quantum meruit or other related 
theory.144 Thus, denying the duress claim avoids the waste of judicial 
resources entailed in granting the defendant a victory which would 
subsequently be overturned in an action by the plaintiff to recover 
the amount owed.145 
In addition to providing a new approach for deciding cases, judicial 
efficiency helps to explain a pattern of cases in which courts have 
refused to find duress when the claimant clearly had a losing case 
on the merits. 146 Courts may refuse to find duress as a way of 
.42 See supra text accompanying notes 96·107 . 
.. , See supra note 6 (discussing the right to avoid agreements entered into under duress) . 
... For a discussion of the circumstances under which restitution would be available as an 
alternative basis of recovery, see E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.20, at 98-104 . 
•46 Other cases in which the judicial economy analysis might prove useful include Enslen v. 
Village of Lombard, 128 III. App. 3d 531, 470 N.E.2d 1188 (1984) (even if the court were to 
find a resignation voidable for duress, the city still might be able to terminate employee); Beznos 
v. Martin, 22 Mich. App. 376, 177 N.W.2d 226 (1970) (even if a finding of duress would entitle 
plaintiff to recover $1,500 paid for the reconveyance, the claimant would still owe defendants 
money for land defendants reconveyed to plaintiff); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 
122 N.H. 1011, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982) (even if the court voids the agreement requiring the 
developer to pay for water connections, the duress claimant would lose a subsequent lawsuit 
since no court would permit a developer to obtain water connections for free); Grad v. Roberts, 
14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964) (even if a note for $5,000 and payment 
of $10,000 were voidable for duress, the underlying contractual obligation would still entitle the 
alleged coercer to a subsequent trial if the plaintiff refused to pay this amount as per the terms 
of the contract) . 
•46 W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) (when 
a subcontractor was previously obligated by contract to furnish window sills, the court found 
no duress in a second agreement to do the work); City of Chicago v. American Nat. Bank & 
Trust Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 784, 497 N.E.2d 413 (1986) (when a property owner challenged an 
agreement for compensation for condemned land on duress grounds, duress was not available 
because the city acted within its rights to institute condemnation proceedings); Schmalz v. 
Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (employee who had no legal basis on 
which to resist termination lost on a duress claim); First Data Resources, Inc. v. Omaha Steaks 
Int'l, Inc., 209 Neb. 327, 307 N.W.2d 790 (1981) (when a claimant alleged duress in agreeing 
to a price increase, duress was unavailable because the alleged coercer had a contractual right 
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discouraging parties from pursuing meritless substantive claims under 
the guise of a duress action. In part this may be explained as an 
effort to conserve scarce judicial resources. Courts may weigh the 
relative costs of a lawsuit on the substantive claim against the costs 
of a lawsuit on the duress claim. Because duress claims involve 
complex determinations of a threat's wrongfulness, as well as of the 
reasonableness of the alternatives, courts may try to discourage duress 
claims when the duress claimant would not prevail on the underlying 
to terminate the agreement to provide services if assent to the price increase was withheld); 
Waara v. Kane, 269 N.W.2d 395 (S.D. 1978) (lessee argued duress in agreeing to a rental increase 
at renewal; but had lessee attempted to challenge the rate increase, he would have lost on the 
merits since presumably on expiration of the lease, city could charge whatever it wanted); 
Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (party alleging duress to 
avoid a contract had a losing claim because the other party had a "right to insist" on reducing 
the joint venture agreement to writing as a condition for plaintiff's withdrawal from a HUD 
application); Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (when bank 
did not have to agree to restructure a debt to facilitate sale of business, seller who was required 
to execute personal guarantees could not complain of duress). 
Alternatively, if the claimant clearly has a substantially meritorious claim that she forsakes 
under a coerced "agreement," the courts more readily entertain claims of duress. Leeper v. 
Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959) (agreement to satisfy a mortgagee's 
false claim on property in order to lift a cloud on title of property is voidable for duress if 
raised within the statute of limitations); Scutti v. State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (claimant who entered into a waiver agreement in order to obtain an 
occupancy permit that had been wrongfully denied prevailed on a duress claim); Wise v. Midtown 
Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (employee suing employer for compensation 
for services rendered was entitled to rescind a settlement agreed to under duress); S.S. & O. 
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (a duress 
claim was available to a customer who agreed to pay sewer connection assessments when charges 
were discriminatory in violation of statute). Nevertheless, the presence of a winning claim does 
not guarantee that the plaintiff will prevail on duress. The court may deny relief where the 
plaintiff had "reasonable alternatives" to the coerced agreement and failed to pursue them. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment b (1979). 
One explanation for the fact that results in duress cases are often linked to the merits of 
the victim's substantive claim focuses on judicial economy concerns. If the duress claimant 
would clearly have lost anyway on the merits, courts should discourage the claimant from 
pursuing a duress claim. Because claimants will inevitably lose on the merits, they will often 
decline to pursue these claims and thereby save the courts from wasting limited resources on 
losing claims. 
Another unarticulated policy concern, which might help to explain why courts are reluctant 
to let plaintiffs win on a duress claim when they could not win on the merits, is a policy 
against wild card results. If duress claimants could routinely prevail in cases that they would 
lose on the merits, then duress claims would pose a challenge to the body of substantive law 
governing the transaction. 
Why, then, do parties with meritorious substantive claims prevail more frequently on duress 
issues? Arguably, judicial economy concerns dictate that the settlement should always be accorded 
finality and that no party should be able to upset a settlement, even on duress grounds. 
Nonetheless, a policy of always denying duress relief to parties with valid substantive claims 
would promote other kinds of inefficiency. Parties who could get a party with a winning claim 
to make an enforceable concession might overvalue the benefit of such contracts, falsely secure 
in the hope that they could capitalize on others' economic straits. That result would promote 
a misallocation of resources. 
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substantive issues. Encouraging a trial whose outcome is relatively 
certain rather than a duress action in which the issues are murkier 
and less well defined helps to conserve judicial resources. By fore­
closing parties from bringing duress claims, courts relegate parties to 
an initial pursuit of the claims on the merits. Because they stand to 
lose at that stage, parties will keep such losing cases out of court, 
thereby saving the court's needed resources for more meritorious 
cases. 
c. How Courts Go Wrong in Failing to Incorporate Judicial 
Economy Analysis 
A court may reach inappropriate results by failing to incorporate 
the judicial economy policy outlined here and continuing to rely 
exclusively on the Restatement's doctrinal tests. Beznos v. Martin147 
illustrates a case in which judicial economy analysis might have proved 
useful because strict doctrinal analysis, applied in isolation, yielded 
undesirable consequences. In Beznos, the plaintiff owned two adjacent 
lots, one with a house and one without. While negotiating for the 
sale of the house (on lot 1), the plaintiff sold off the vacant lot (lot 
2). When the purchaser of the vacant lot discovered that the driveway 
to the house on lot 1 encroached on his property, he threatened to 
destroy it unless the original owner, the plaintiff in this case, gave 
him $1,500.148 The plaintiff agreed to pay that amount in return for 
a deed to the driveway, but later argued that the money had been 
extorted under duress. 149 Without a deed to the entire driveway, the 
plaintiff would have been unable to sell lot 1 with the house. Thus, 
arguably, the plaintiff had no choice but to acquiesce in the de­
mand. 150 The court's analysis focused on the plaintiff's duress claim 
and whether the transaction was "voluntary."151 The court found 
enough facts to raise an issue of duress. 152 
Because it is so amorphous and manipulable, the voluntariness 
theory cannot resolve the duress claim. Even under the Restatement 
I" 22 Mich. App. 376, 177 N.W.2d 226 (1970). 

1'8Id. at 377-78, 177 N.W.2d at 227. 

I<9Id. at 378, 177 N.W.2d at 227. 

1.0 It was not literally true that the vendor had no choice; however, the choice of jeopardizing 
the house sale was unpalatable. See supra note 9 (discussing the concept of "constrained" 
choices). 
1'1 Beznos, 22 Mich. App. at 378-79, 177 N.W.2d at 227. 

1.2Id. at 379, 177 N.W.2d at 227-28. 
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test,153 it is not clear what the outcome in Beznos would be, or if 
that outcome would reflect a proper result. The court would have to 
grapple with the "wrongfulness" of the threat. In the instant case 
the defendants threatened to destroy the part of the driveway that 
they owned unless the plaintiffs compensated them. Since the land 
was the defendants', they could do with it whatever they wanted. 154 
Under a moral baseline approach, one could argue that because the 
threatening party was not obligated to give up or even permit use of 
the driveway, the threat to destroy it would not violate any legal or 
moral duty; therefore, a duress claim should not succeed. ISS The 
proposal by the owner of the vacant lot, to sell the section of driveway 
rather than destroy it, was an offer to make the plaintiff better off, 
and not a coercive threat.ls6 
In duress analysis, however, whether a legal act is wrongful depends 
upon the context. 157 Neither the wrongfulness nor the moral baseline 
approaches determine whether an action is wrongful because threat­
ening to exercise one's legal rights does not by itself resolve the 
question of the propriety of the threat for Restatement purposes. 
When the destruction of one's own property would secure no inherent 
benefit, a threat to destroy it would be wrongful if made merely to 
extort money from another party and if the "resulting exchange is 
(." See supra note 38. 
", There is no clear standard attached to a concept based on "doing what one wants with 
one's own property." This can be seen by contrasting Beznos with Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 
N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1959). In Wolf, the plaintiffs sued to recover 
a deposit on a house purchase that never closed. Id. at 280, 154 A.2d at 626. In defending its 
refusal to return the deposit, the builder argued that it had been coerced into not consummating 
the sale when the plaintiffs threatened to resell the house to an undesirable buyer should the 
builder force the plaintiffs to go through with the sale. Id. at 282, 154 A.2d at 627-28. The 
subsequent sale would reportedly ruin the builder's business. Id. Despite a finding that the 
plaintiffs could lawfully sell the property to an "undesireable purchaser" should the deal close, 
the court found the threat to be improper and coercive. Id. at 288, 154 A.2d at 630. Thus, if 
the trial court found that the threats were made, and believed the builder's will was overcome, 
the defendants could "treat the contrac.t. as breached, and recover damages." Id. at 288-89, 154 
A.2d at 631. Beznos and Wolf demonstrate that there are limits to the legitimate use of one's 
property. 
It is difficult to resolve the question of the "wrongfulness" of the proposal in Beznos, because 
a mere determination of lawfulness based on the idea that owners can do what they want with 
their own property does not resolve the issue. This Article suggests one means-judicial 
economy-for resolving the propriety of the threat when a reference to wrongfulness will not 
suffice. 
I.'" See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text. 
'''' Id. 
",7 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; see also Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. 
Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (coercer's threat found wrongful for 
purposes of duress action even though the act threatened was lawful) . 
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not on fair terms."158 Thus, in Beznos, even assuming that the threat 
harmed the recipient and did not benefit the maker of the threat, 
one would still need to resolve whether the exchange was fair. If 
threats to exercise one's legal rights can provide the foundation for 
a successful duress claim, the question becomes which legal threats 
give rise to a claim. The Restatement tests are inadequate because 
they state that sometimes an action is acceptable and sometimes it 
is not. 159 Because they are so open-ended, the supplemental Restate­
ment tests, which focus on unfair exchange, unfair dealing, and the 
illegitimate use of power, are also inadequate guidelines on wrong­
fulness. 16o 
A final problem with the Restatement test is that to decide whether 
the threat is wrongful or violative of a moral norm requires a circular 
analysis. One cannot determine whether an action is wrongful or 
violates a norm without an a priori understanding of whether the 
behavior is acceptable. Thus, a rights-based approach derived from 
either the Restatement or a moral baseline does not resolve the issue 
of whether a threatened action is wrongful. 
The policy of judicial economy could resolve these ambiguities. 
Under the judicial economy analysis the appropriate question becomes: 
Slwuld duress be available in Beznos when the threat is the exercise 
of a legal right? The court should find no duress because doing so 
would only temporarily assist the plaintiff. Presumably, the defendant 
would then bring an action for restitution for the value of the property 
conveyed. A finding of duress will not solve the problem, but merely 
add judicial costs. The parties will still have to expend additional 
resources in order to reach a settlement on the driveway's value and 
barring that, another court case will follow. 161 
2. Continued Efficiency Concerns: Minimizing the Costs of 
Resource Misallocation 
A second efficiency rationale which should be adopted in duress 
-------------------------------------------------------.----­
I" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1979); see also E.A. FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 6, § 4.17, at 263. 
1&9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 & comments (1979) . 
160 See id. § 176(2)(b)-(c); see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1035 (" [Olur doctrine has not 
developed reliable guidelines for distinguishing this unacceptable conduct from the kind of self­
interested and self-reliant conduct on which the contractual system is based."). 
161 See infra Section III G (discussing economic negligence and exploring other policy reasons 
which support a denial of the duress claim in Beznos). For more discussion of the economic 
negligence concept, see infra text accompanying notes 376-85. 
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cases focuses on the efficient prevention of resource misallocation. 
This policy promotes the efficient allocation of resources by 
putting the risk of voidability due to duress on the party who can 
more easily discover that the deal was not voluntary.162 A deal is not 
voluntary if it is not likely to be value-maximizing for both par­
162 Some critics might decry the return to voluntariness as an arbiter of duress. One could 
argue that it does not make sense to designate voluntariness as a central component of duress 
analysis because contracts entered into under extreme pressure are still voluntary in the sense 
that the aggrieved party was still able to "choose rationally." See Bayles, Reconceptualizing 
Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1209-10 (1987). This Article, however, focuses 
on voluntariness in a different sense. It is not concerned with whether the victim actually 
desired the transaction, the traditional focus of the will theory, see supra notes 20 and 61, but 
with whether the coercer is likely to be aware that the deal is unlikely to be value-maximizing 
for the victim. Professor Hillman discusses this concept when he suggests a presumption that 
"a modification that involves a substantial net loss on the contract to the promisor is the 
product of coercion." Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and 
the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L . REV. 849, 886 (1979) [hereinafter Hillman, Contract 
Modifications]. The "tip-off" that an agreement was coerced follows from the idea that "[r]easonable 
persons ordinarily will not voluntarly [sic] relinquish important contract rights in return for 
nothing or for very little." Id. at 885. The test, which is based on the efficient cost avoider 
concept, is similar to a "reason to know" test. See Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial 
Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 712-716 (1984) (discussing the use of the reason to know test 
in promissory estoppel cases); Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 793-96 (1982) (explaining the use of the reason to know test to 
determine whether a contract was made). 
There are three types of fact patterns which should raise a substantial doubt in the mind of 
the putative coercer as to whether the deal is value-maximizing for the victim. In the first, the 
difference between what the victim gives up and what the putative coercer gains in the exchange 
is disproportionate. In the second type, the coercer withholds information from the victim and 
it is not clear that the victim would have entered the deal had she been fully informed. Thus, 
the deal is presumptively not value-maximizing. See infra notes 210-46 and accompanying text. 
In the third type of case, there are persuasive barriers to bargaining that interfere with self­
interested hard bargaining. In all of these cases, the alleged coercer is, or should be, on notice 
that the deal is too good to be true (disproportionately in her favor) and that the agreement 
may not reflect the victim's best interest. 
First Nat'l Bank v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1976) is an example of a case involving 
disproportionality in the exchange. When an attorney found a buyer for a corporation, but the 
deal did not close, the attorney refused to turn over the corporate papers required for another 
sale until stockholders paid him a $100,000 fee. Id. at 715. The attorney in this case demanded 
payment even though he "had no reasonable basis for believing he was entitled to [the amount]" 
he extracted from the stockholders. -id. ; see also Furman v. Gulf Ins. Co., 152 F.2d 891 (8th 
Cir. 1946) (when an insurance agent gave up an agency worth $20-25,000 in return for a release 
from liability for $7,000 in debts, a valid claim of duress was stated); International Paper Co. 
v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985) (duress found when victim agreed to indemnify paper 
company, which did not disclose the fact that there was $40,000 in potential liabilities, in 
exchange for payment of an admitted debt of $7,000); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. 
Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) (duress claim valid when debtor, knowing 
creditor's financial difficulty, offered a $97,500 settlement on an acknowledged debt of $260,000­
300,000); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1157, 204 Cal. 
Rptr. 86, 88 (1984) (duress found when a subcontractor acquiesced in a $50,000 settlement of 
an outstanding debt exceeding $72,000 "in order to survive"); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 
231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (jury question on duress when an employee released claims 
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ties. 163 If one party could easily discovet the involuntariness of the 
transaction but enters into the deal anyway, the court should more 
readily grant relief to the victim.164 Therefore, the party who can 
easily prevent a misallocation of resources will have an incentive to 
do SO.165 On the other hand, if it would burden the coercer to ascertain 
whether the deal is involuntary or if it would have other economic 
or social costs that discourage acceptable behavior,166 courts should 
be reluctant to find duress because it would increase the costs of 
for services rendered that exceeded $6,800 for $200 under a threat of financial ruin and loss of 
new job) . 
Cases involving the failure of one party to disclose information relevant to whether the deal 
is value-maximizing for the other party are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 210-46. 
The third category includes cases in which the agreement may not be value-maximizing for 
one party and that fact is likely to be evident to the other party. These cases involve persuasive 
barriers or reasons why one party does not bargain in its best interest. Such barriers are likely 
to exist when the victim is enmeshed in a relationship with a third party such that she is 
unable to act vigorously in her self interest. Cf. Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 936-40 (discussing 
relationships between the bargaining parties themselves) . For cases recognizing the impact of 
a relationship with a third party, see Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 
N.W.2d 2 (1985) (parents permitted to avoid a mortgage and guarantee agreement that they 
executed under a threat of prosecution of their son) ; Port of Nehalem v. Nicholson, 122 Or. 
523,259 P. 900 (1927) (defendant's agreement to pay $4,407.34 to prevent the criminal prosecution 
of a family member was voidable on the basis of duress), overruled on other grounds, Godell 
v. Johnson, 244 Or. 587, 418 P .2d 505 (1966) . 
It is possible to posit separate rationales for each of these lines of cases. For example, a 
finding that the cases which involve a disproportionality in exchange are more likely to 
successfully invoke duress can be explained in terms of a regulatory concern with policing unfair 
bargains, see, e.g., Dawson, supra note 3, at 282-88 (discussing duress in terms of preventing 
unjust enrichment), or in terms of the intrusion of distributive or altruistic motives. The 
distributive justice explanation cannot and should not be summarily rejected. Many modern 
commentators subscribe to the notion of duress as a doctrine for correcting unfair exchanges. 
See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 3, at 1031-39 (discussing modern contract law and its focus on 
fairness) . Nevertheless, the distributive justice or fairness explanation for duress claims is not 
entirely satisfactory. If one were to carry distributive and fairness concerns to their logical 
conclusion, then more plaintiffs would prevail than currently do. Moreover, if fairness is the 
operative norm, it is not clear why duress doctrine has not been extended to correct imbalances 
in available resources that limit some parties' choices. See supra note 9. 
One advantage of an explanation based on the efficient resource allocation theory is that it 
provides an overarching theory capable of explaining different lines of cases. Thus, it would 
meet one of Professor Barnett's criteria for a superior theory-this is, that ~'the number of 
known problems the theory handles as well or better than its rivals . . . ." Barnett, supra note 
1, at 270. Moreover, denying enforcement of such bargains would have the significant benefit 
of avoiding a costly waste of resources. Finally, it would provide a mechanism for courts to 
avoid reading erroneous results that might obtain if they followed current theories. See infra 
text accompanying notes 200-09. 
163 One of the primary benefits to voluntary exchange is that it maximizes value on both an 
individual and societal basis. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 120, at 1-2. 
I .. Allocating the cost of a misallocation to the party who can most easily prevent the problem 
is a proper basis for formulating legal rules. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, InfomUJ.tion, and 
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-9 (1978) (discussing allocation of risk). 
166 Id. at 7. 

166 See infra text accompanying notes 266-80. 
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contracting. In addition, the policy of efficient prevention of resource 
misallocation would promote standardization of applications of duress 
and supplement difficult doctrinal analysis. 167 
Courts should consider several factors in deciding if either party 
is in a better position to prevent a misallocation of resources. These 
factors include whether persuasive barriers that interfere with a party's 
hard bargaining exist168 and whether there is an apparent dispropor­
tionality in the exchange. If such barriers are palpable and one party 
can easily detect them while the other party cannot, and the barriers 
are accompanied by a disproportionate exchange, the court should 
more readily allocate the risk of duress to the party who can easily 
prevent resource misallocation. This would reduce contracting costs 
by reducing the resources that must be devoted to discovering errors 
in resource allocation. This approach is consistent with that taken 
in other contexts such as mistake l69 and fraud. 170 
Another factor that courts should consider is the merits of the 
victim's claim. If the victim has a losing case, the other party will 
assume that any deal offered is enforceable and valid. The coercer 
is likely to assume that whatever she offers the other party is within 
acceptable norms and that she will not be accused of coercion in 
connection with extra concessions to the "victim." It would be difficult 
and costly to deter behavior that is considered "normal." If such 
behavior is subject to a charge of coercion, it may lead coercers to 
overcompensate to avoid all potential deals that the other party may 
later exploit for duress purposes. This would not be efficient or 
conducive to economic investment. 
It would also be costly to deter the coercer when the victim has 
no legal rights and the coercer is the one who makes the concession 
because there is nothing to arouse the coercer's suspicions about the 
transaction. When the coercer makes the concessions, receiving noth­
ing that she is not already entitled tO,171 she is likely to assume that 
the transaction, if voidable by anyone, would be voidable by her on 
the ground of lack of consideration.172 In this instance, the party who 
167 See infra text accompanying notes 210-46. 
168 For a discussion of the types of barriers that can interfere with self-interested hard 
bargaining, see Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 935-40. 
". See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153, 154 (1979). 
170 See id. § 164. 
171 The parameters to the entitlement may be set by the terms of the contract. 
172 That assumption is likely to arise because in other contexts, a disproportionality in exchange 
may entitle the adversely affected party to avoid its contract obligation. See, e.g., Jones v. Star 
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (when the contract price was 
unconscionable, the court reformed the installment contract to reflect the amount paid). 
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is in the best position to detect a misallocation of resources would 
not be the coercer. The only party with reason to suspect a misal­
location would be the victim; therefore, the court should not find 
duress as it would place the burden of detection on the wrong party. 
a. Applying the Efficient Prevention of Resource Misallocation Concept 
Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc.173 illustrates the difficulty of detecting 
the involuntariness of an agreement. In Bicknell Minerals, Union 
Minere began negotiating to buy Bicknell Minerals from its share­
holders.174 After some negotiations, the parties concluded a tentative 
oral agreement under which the buyer would pay a stipulated amount 
for the stock and would also release the shareholders from certain 
liabilities.175 When Union Minere's board of directors would not ratify 
the tentative purchase agreement, the parties executed a written 
agreement containing terms less favorable to the stockholders. 176 When 
the buyer sued for specific performance of the written agreement, the 
shareholders counterclaimed requesting that the written agreement 
be reformed to the original oral terms, arguing that they had ac­
quiesced to the less favorable written agreement under duress.!77 The 
court rejected the duress claim because "there is no evidence of any 
wrongful act or coercion of the shareholders" by the buyer. 178 Addi­
tionally, the court found that the seller's absence of choice was not 
caused by the buyer. 179 The seller was in financial straits due to its 
own actions in a prior default.180 Moreover, the court found no lack 
of free will. 18l 
Bicknell Minerals can be analyzed under the normative standards 
of the Restatement's wrongful act doctrinal element. 182 It is not clear, 
however, that the conclusion of no wrongful act is compelled. The 
stockholders' claim is that the buyer took advantage of the seller's 
economic straits, causing it to succumb to unfavorable contract terms. 
Was this pressure merely hard bargaining or was it wrongful coer­
173 480 N.E.2d 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 

I" Id. at 568. 

mId. at 569. 

nOld. 
177 [d. at 569-70. 
178 [d. at 571. 
1791d. 
180 Id. 
181/d. at 571-72. 

18' Id. (focusing on the wrongful act question). 
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cion?183 One application of the wrongful act doctrine suggests the 
following analysis. Because the buyer was not obligated to close the 
deal, he could insist on any terms he chose to close the deal. 184 From 
this perspective, the Bicknell Minerals case is no different from any 
case in which one party negotiating a deal says to the other party: 
"Here are my terms-take them or leave them." Under that conceptual 
framework, the threat not to close except on the given terms is not 
wrongful. To hold otherwise would subject all contracts to claims of 
voidability on duress grounds because most contract negotiations 
include a threat at some point not to close except on certain terms. 185 
Because there is no obligation to close, threats in such circumstances 
are not wrongful. 186 
Bicknell Minerals can also be viewed as a situation in which one 
party with no contract obligation to the other, exploits the other's 
economic straits. If so, it is not so easy to conclude that the conduct 
of the purchaser was benign. Even when a coercer has no obligation 
to make an offer to the other party, the resulting agreement may be 
voidable for duress, if she exploits the dire economic straits of the 
other party to extract a favorable deal. I87 The issue becomes what 
factor establishes an actionable claim. l88 The wrongfulness analysis 
fails to provide an answer. 
In Bicknell Minerals, the court also justified its holding of no duress 
on the finding that the buyer did not cause the stockholders' "pre­
carious" economic situation. 18g This explanation offers no help ana­
lytically because courts sometimes find a wrongful act even when the 
183 See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.17, at 263-64 (distinguishing legitimate from 
improper use of power). 
184 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 41-44, 214 (discussing the relationship between a lack 
of obligation and an absence of duress). 
I" Ct. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239 ("Plainly most contracts that are enforced are 
entered into merely as a means of avoiding a less desirable alternative, hence this fact cannot 
be said to impair that real consent which is essential."). 
186 This can be seen in Bicknell Minerals. See supra notes 173-98 and accompanying text. 
The case involves an implied threat amounting to "deal with us on these terms or there is no 
deal." 
187 In every situation in which the putative coercer makes the offer "take my terms or none," 
the coercer could argue that she is protected because the victim can always walk away from 
the deal. But in some instances a court views that option as unpalatable and finds duress. 
Thus, the option of walking away from the deal cannot itself explain the Bicknell Minerals 
result. 
188 It could be argued that actionable claims involve unfairly taking advantage of another's 
economic necessities, but it is not clear what factors would prevent that same analysis from 
voiding unfavorable contracts to which parties agree because they have few alternatives. 
189 Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
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coercer's contribution to the victim's economic straits is problematic. 190 
Thus, the fact that the buyer did not cause the stockholders' dire 
financial straits does not preclude a claim of duress. The labeling of 
the action as not wrongful thus seems mechancially easy to reach 
without being compelled or inevitably correct. 
To resolve any doctrinal ambiguities in the Bicknell Minerals case 
the court should analyze the case under the resource misallocation 
rubric. In Bicknell Minerals, the buyer (putative coercer) would prob­
ably not suspect resource misallocation for several reasons. The parties 
were deemed to be "sophisticated businesses and businessmen dealing 
with each other on behalf of their principals."191 In this respect, there 
were no obvious impediments to the parties being able to act ruthlessly 
in pursuing their self-interest. 192 Furthermore, the parties were not 
locked into an ongoing relationship.193 Had they been, there might 
have been persuasive barriers to self-interested negotiation. Moreover, 
because the shareholders had pursued the possibility of a sale to 
another entity, they appeared to be capable of acting in their self­
interest. 194 Finally, as part of the deal the buyer agreed to assume 
certain bank debts, to release the individual shareholders from per­
sonal liabilities, and to give the shareholders two million dollars from 
future income.!95 There appears to be no gross disparity in the ex­
change;196 both the buyer and the shareholders were taking certain 
risks and obtaining certain benefits. The buyer gained shares that 
could become more or less valuable in exchange for incurring sub­
stantial liability. The shareholders were relieved of certain liabilities 
but risked the possibility that the shares could become more valuable 
in the hands of the buyer. 19? 
"" When a debtor threatens to withhold an admitted debt or to pay less than the amount 
owed, the court must decide whether the proposal to pay less was mere exploitation of the 
creditor's economic straits or whether the proposer contributed to the financial difficulties. In 
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) the 
court cited the rule that economic necessities alone are insufficient for a duress claim unless 
they are caused by the coercer, and then found sufficient evidence of duress to require a trial. 
In order to win, the creditor would have to establish causation between its economic straits 
and the threat to delay payment if the creditor did not settle for a lesser amount. Id. at 18­
19. It is not clear that it will be able to establish this unless it is determined that all threats 
to pay a reduced amount to a creditor automatically "cause" desperate financial straits. 
191 Bicknell Minerals, 480 N.E.2d at 571. 
192 See Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 935-40 (discussing barriers to self-interested hard bar­
gaining). 
19:1 See Bicknell Minerals, 480 N.E.2d at 568-69. 

19' Id. at 571. 

19:, Id. at 569. 

196 See supra note 162 (discussing disproportionality of exchange as a factor) . 
197 Each party to a contract takes certain risks in the hope that future gains will result from 
taking the risk. 
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Because nO "red flags" existed to indicate problems in bargaining 
power or unconscionable dealing, the buyer in Bicknell Minerals should 
have been able to assume that the deal was voluntary. As this 
transaction entailed risks and benefits for both sides,198 there would 
have been an enormous cost in alerting the buyers to the shareholders' 
secret doubts about the transaction. On the other hand, the share­
holders were in a position to know that the buyer would never have 
assumed the debts and liabilities without the tendered stock. Thus, 
the shareholders were in the best position to prevent a misallocation 
of resources. To find duress against the buyer would put an undue 
burden on the buyer to discover involuntariness. 199 If the court per­
mitted an economic duress claim, transaction costs of negotiating the 
sale would have been wasted. To avoid that result, future buyers will 
have to expend resources toward discovering whether the seller has 
any duress grounds for attacking the deal. To permit a claim of 
duress in such a situation would promote an inefficient use of re­
sources. Thus, it makes economic sense to deny the duress claim. 
The case of Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest CO.200 provides an 
example of how the resource misallocation theory permits an outcome 
different from that reached by the court under traditional doctrinal 
duress analysis. In that case, the court ignored the resource misal­
location policy and reached an erroneous result. The plaintiff/sub­
contractor had agreed to complete a job for a fixed fee and rather 
than terminate the job when the defendant/general contractor delayed 
in supplying materials, the plaintiff agreed to complete the job for a 
negotiated extra amount. 201 
Upon completion, the subcontractor submitted a claim for $120,000, 
but the general contractor refused to pay more than $67,000.202 The 
subcontrator was "in desperate financial straits" and therefore ac­
198 For examples in which the court found no actionable duress since there appeared to be 
risk and benefit on both sides, see Higgins v. Brunswick Corp., 76 Ill. App. 3d 273, 395 N.E.2d 
81 (1979) (creditor-lessor dismissed its_lawsuit and paid off unsecured creditors of debtor· lessor 
in exchange for a lease of a bowling alley); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. 
lOll, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982) (city (purported coercer) constructed water connections needed for 
builder's apartment complex in exchange for builder's agreement to pay for the connections); 
Grad v. Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964) (stock was released 
in exchange for payment of a legitimate debt); Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1984) (settlement for services rendered was exchanged for a waiver, which allowed a 
closing to go forward). 
199 Otherwise, alleged coercers will devote an enormous expenditure of resources to ascertaining 
the voluntariness of a transaction, which will contribute to a misallocation of resources. 
200 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983). 
201 Id. at 926. 
202Id. 
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quiesced in the lower payment.203 The subcontractor filed suit against 
the general contractor claiming that the reduced settlement had been 
procured by duress.204 
The Selmer court rejected the duress claim because the putative 
coercer had not actually caused the purported victim's economic 
distress. 205 The court noted the importance of enforcing contractual 
settlements in order to uphold the reliability of out-of-court resolutions 
of contract disputes to protect parties who could not afford to liti­
gate.206 
There are several difficulties in the court's justifications for the 
conclusion that no duress existed. The policy favoring settlements 
does not resolve the basic problem of contract law that arises from 
the difficulty of distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable 
settlements.207 Likewise, the court's second justification, that the de­
fendant did not cause the claimant's economic difficulties, has proven 
not to be determinative.208 
Under the misallocation of resources test, the duress claim should 
have been allowed in Selmer. The general contractor was the party 
in the best position to prevent a misallocation of resources. Clearly, 
the subcontractor would not have continued to expend resources had 
the general contractor not agreed to pay the additional amount. 
Because the general contractor specifically sought the expenditures, 
the subcontractor had no reason to suspect that the general contractor 
would refuse to pay extra for the work caused by the delay. 
The resource misallocation theory might have advantages over a 
fairness theory based on disproportionality in exchange.209 The set­
tlement for the extra expenses might not be so grossly disproportionate 
as to be unfair. Nevertheless, because the general contractor had 
every reason to believe that the subcontractor would not have allocated 
his resources for the job if the general contractor had not agreed to 
pay the extra expenses incurred, the resource misallocation theory 
suggests that the agreement should be voidable. Otherwise a party 
who might easily prevent resource misallocation will fail to do so, 
promoting costly misallocation. 
203 [d. 
20< [d. 
205 [d. at 928-29. 
206 [d. at 928. 
207 If the policy favoring settlements were in fact determinative, then no settlements would 
be voidable for duress. 
208 See supra note 190. 
209 See supra note 162. 
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b. Explaining the Success of Duress Cases Involving Fraud Based on 
Efficient Prevention of Resource Misallocation 
The line of cases involving the intersection of fraud and coercive 
proposals implicitly reflects the importance of the resource misallo­
cation analysis in deciding duress issues.2lo Under the resource mis­
allocation analysis the party that commits fraud by withholding 
relevant and material information could easily have disclosed the 
information and prevented a resource misallocation by the less in­
formed party.211 Therefore, the party committing fraud should be 
subject to the risk of voidability on the ground of duress. 
Application of the efficient prevention of resource misallocation 
theory to cases involving both fraud and duress issues21z will effectively 
show why plaintiffs are likely to prevail on duress. The recognition 
of a resource misallocation analysis achieves the societal benefit of 
preventing resource misallocation at a low cost, thereby promoting 
economic efficiency. The resource misallocation theory also provides 
a normative standard for deciding cases and thus promotes predict­
ability in judicial decisionmaking. In contrast, when approached from 
210 For a case recognizing the interconnection between fraud and duress, see Leeper v. Beltrami, 
53 Cal. 2d 195, 207, 347 P .2d 12, 21, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1959) ("The two types of wrongdoing, 
duress and fraud, are often factually closely interconnected and indistinguishable."). This Article 
explains both doctrines in terms of one theory based on the efficient prevention of resource 
misallocation. 
211 The party committing the fraud withholds or distorts information when the disclosure of 
that information could have prevented resource misallocation. This assumes, of course, that a 
fully informed party will not misallocate their resources. 
21' See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985) (blanket indemnity 
was voidable for duress where defendant indemnitee withheld information bearing on potential 
liability of indemnitor); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 
204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984) (after defendant misled plaintiff into thinking that extra expenses 
incurred in performing a grading contract would be covered, defendant then demanded that 
plaintiff accept less than the amount promised and was subject to a duress claim); Scutti v. 
State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (where county misled property owners 
and refused to issue a necessary perm.it because of nonexisting setback violations, the resulting 
agreement, which limited damages for this property taking was voidable for duress); Manufac­
turers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (bank customer was permitted 
to allege duress in signing a note where bank erroneously indicated a failure to sign would 
subject the maker to criminal and civil penalties); Peter Matthews Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc., 
117 A.D.2d 943, 499 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1986) (moving company presented a bill of lading limiting 
damages to $15,000, but there was no evidence that a liability limit had been disclosed when 
plaintiff selected the moving company); Harstad v. Frol, 41 Wash. App. 294, 704 P.2d 638 
(1985) (broker-agent failed to disclose a personal interest in the transaction and further misled 
seller into believing that seller must assume a large debt to close the real estate deal); Litten 
v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 220 Pa. Super. 274, 286 A.2d 913 (1971) (buyer who misled seller into 
believing that an oral agreement would govern a subsequent dealing threatened a breach unless 
seller entered a written agreement with substantially different terms). 
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a purely doctrinal standpoint under the Restatement test for duress, 
the finding of duress remains inexplicable. Courts are likely to find 
contracts voidable for duress even though the doctrinal requirements 
of duress are not met. 
International Paper Co. v. Whilden21 3 illustrates this type of fraud 
and duress situation. In this case, a paper company, International, 
agreed to buy timber from the owners of a tract of land.214 A third 
party, Whilden, who had contracted to cut and haul the timber, 
entered into a subsequent contract to buy logs from International 
and made a down payment as required by the contract.215 After the 
cutting project was finished, International owed Whilden $7,000,216 
which represented the difference between the advance payment and 
the actual cost of the 10gs.2!7 International refused to refund the excess 
money unless Whilden agreed to indemnify International for liability 
to the land owner for damages allegedly arising out of the cutting 
project.218 Whilden agreed to the indemnity provision, but later claimed 
that he was unaware the land owner was claiming $40,000 in damages 
against International for its unauthorized cutting of trees. 219 Appar­
ently, Whilden was under the impression that thirty unauthorized 
trees had been cut down. 22o In fact, the total was 650.221 
At trial, Whilden was successful in arguing that the indemnity 
agreement had been executed under duress. 222 The appellate court 
upheld this finding based on the unequal bargaining power between 
the parties,223 and the plaintiff's financial hardship.224 
Under traditional contract law, the "threat" to withhold an admitted 
debF25 is not enough on its own to support a finding of duress. 226 
The additional factors cited by the court-unequal bargaining power 
and economic hardship to plaintiff-are also insufficient to mandate 
'" 469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985). 





'16Id. at 562. 

'" Id. at 561. 













'" Id. at 563-64. 
22:; Id. at 563. 
22' E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.18, at 266 ("[C]ourts have traditionally assumed that 
a reasonable alternative was available in the case of a threat not to pay money ...."). 
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a finding of duress. 227 Furthermore, the plaintiff must ordinarily show 
that the defendant caused the plaintiffs economic hardship.228 Al­
though the court found that Whilden had no reasonable alternative 
but to agree to indemnify, other courts have refused to provide relief 
for a party who has agreed to particular terms because of the seemingly 
greater economic leverage and bargaining power of the other party.229 
The court's willingness in International Paper to find duress despite 
the factors that weigh against such a holding may be partially at­
tributable to International's nondisclosure of the extent of the liability 
for improperly cut timber. Nevertheless, an examination of the un­
derlying policy concerns of the efficient prevention of resource mis­
allocation doctrine may explain why the court relaxed the require­
ments for duress in this case. 
Under the efficient prevention of resource misallocation doctrine, 
International should assume the risk of voidability because it withheld 
information concerning the improperly cut timber,230 knowing that it 
was depriving Whilden of material information that might have af­
fected Whilden's willingness to sign the indemnity agreement. Inter­
national was clearly in the best position to prevent a misallocation 
of Whilden's resources. Whilden had no reason to suspect that the 
deal with International was not in International's best interest. If 
duress had been denied, future parties relying on this doctrine would 
m Unequal bargaining power alone is not a sufficient basis for invalidating contracts on duress 
grounds. If unequal bargaining power were operative as an independent determinative factor, 
then most cases of duress would be decided in favor of the claimants. As one commentator 
stated: 
If the mere fact of impaired bargaining power, in combination with an inequivalence of 
exchange, were enough to invoke duress doctrine, impaired bargaining power would not serve 
the purpose Dawson acknowledges it still must: isolating just those kinds of impairment 
that the law is prepared to redress without feeling that the whole structure of bargaining 
between un equals is put in jeopardy. 
Dalton, supra note 3 at 1031. 
228 Courts generally require a showing that the plaintiff's dire financial circumstances have 
been caused by the defendent. If the defendant merely takes advantage of already existing 
circumstances, the plaintiff is not usu~y successful in claiming duress. See, e.g., W.R. Grimshaw 
Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) ("The assertion of duress must 
be proven by evidence that the duress resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive conduct 
and not by plaintiff's necessities."), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 912 (1958); Fruhauf Sw. Garment 
Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ("It has become settled law that 
the mere stress of business conditions will not constitute duress where the defendant was not 
responsible for those circumstances."); First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 
179, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) ("Stress of business conditions will not constitute duress unless 
the defendant was responsible for that condition."). 
229 See, e.g., Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (despite inequality 
in bargaining power generally found between employer and employee, employee loses on the 
duress claim). 
230 International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985). 
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incur excessive search costs to determine whether the proposed trans­
action was value-maximizing, thus increasing contracting costs. 
Rich & Whitlock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc. 231 is an illustration 
of a situation in which the "victim" of coercion incurs an expense 
at the behest of the "coercer." The coercer then offers the victim a 
settlement that differs materially from that which was promised to 
secure the expenditures. The victim acquiesces and then sues for 
duress.232 In this case, the defendant/general contractor hired the 
plaintiff/subcontractor to do excavation work for a fixed amount.233 
The contract expressly stated that "[a]ny rock encountered will be 
considered an extra at current rental rates."234 When rock was en­
countered, the parties negotiated a price for the blasting work but 
"emphasized, however, [that] the estimate was not firm and the actual 
cost could go much higher due to the unpredictable nature of rock 
work."235 During the excavation, the general contractor did not ques­
tion the interim billings and assured the subcontractor that the extra 
costs would be paid.236 When the subcontractor posted the final billing, 
the general contractor refused to pay the billed amount and offered 
a substantially lower settlement.237 The subcontractor agreed to the 
settlement because it was "'under duress in that [they] felt they 
would face financial ruin if they did not accept the lesser sum and 
that defendants, knowing this, threatened no further payment 
unless'" the lower sum was accepted.238 The Rich & Whillock court 
found that the defendant's settlement offer was made in bad faith 
and was coercive given the circumstances of the plaintiff's precarious 
financial position and the possibility of impending bankruptcy.239 The 
plaintiff was therefore permitted to rescind the settlement agreement 
and the court awarded the full amount due under the original agree­
ment.240 
The Rich & Whitlock result granting duress relief does make eco­
2.'l1 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984). 
2.12 See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (general 
contractor made subcontractor a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer of $67,000 on a $120,000 
claim). 
213 Rich & Whitlock, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 87. 
23< Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id., 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
237Id. at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
236 Id. at 1157, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. The general contractor offered to pay the subcontractor 
$50,000 on the remaining balance of $72,286.45 if the subcontractor accepted the lower payment 
and signed a standard release. Id. at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
239Id. at 1160, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91. 
2<OId. at 1161, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 91. 
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nomic sense when analyzed under a burden allocation analysis. Yet 
an examination of other cases suggests that a denial of relief might 
also have been appropriate because courts have often refused relief 
on grounds of duress when a party has agreed to settlement because 
of serious financial problems.241 Moreover, where the facts are reversed 
and the party seeking relief for duress has been subjected to a price 
increase, rather than a reduced settlement offer, courts have refused 
to grant that relief despite financial problems.242 Courts rationalize 
their refusals of relief by distinguishing "causing" from merely "taking 
advantage" of an unequal situation.243 Courts posit that unless the 
putative coercer was directly responsible for, or "caused" the "vic­
tim's" necessitous economic circumstances,244 no relief is available. 
In Rich & Whitlock, although the defendant's low offer certainly made 
an already precarious economic situation worse, it is hard to conclude 
that the defendant caused the impending bankruptcy. If Rich & Willock 
is indicative of the manner in which the "causing" doctrine will 
typically be analyzed, it may prove so manipulable that no party can 
rely on the result of its application. 
Because the result in Rich & Whillock is problematic in light of 
existing doctrinal distinctions, the efficient prevention of resource 
misallocation doctrine should be applied to help explain the holding 
of the case. Under the theory of efficient prevention of resource 
misallocation doctrine, the general contractor was in the best position 
to prevent a misallocation of resources. The risk of voidability on 
duress grounds should have been allocated to him, and the subcon­
tractor left with the option to rescind the reduced settlement. At the 
time the subcontractor allocated its resources to excavation the general 
contractor had every reason to know that the subcontractor would 
not allocate resources to the rock excavation without an agreement 
to be paid in full for the extra work. 245 In order to encourage disclosure 
of material information affecting resource allocation and thus the 
24' See, e.g., Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N.W. 511, 514 (1881) (refusal by debtor 
to pay the full debt that was due did not constitute duress despite the fact that "plaintiff was 
in great need of the money and might be financially ruined in case he failed to obtain it"). 
242 See, e.g., London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1965) 
(finding no duress when defendant refused to perform a contract unless plaintiff paid more for 
the land even though plaintiff's failure to agree would subject him to economic hardship). 
2<3 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 39-41 (discussing "causing" and "taking advantage" 
as distinguished in case law). 
2« [d. at 39. 
245 Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. 
86, 88 (1984). 
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efficient use of resources, claims of duress by parties in the position 
of the subcontractor ought to be granted.246 
c. Under the Efficient Prevention of Resource Misallocation Doctrine 
Agreements are Voidable When There is No Reasonable Basis for the 
Threat of Civil Process 
Efficient prevention of resource misallocation offers an explanatory 
rationale for another application of the duress doctrine. Traditionally, 
a party may void an agreement when civil process is threatened but 
there is no reasonable basis for believing that the claim has merit.247 
Although commentators have rationalized this result in terms of abuse 
of process, efficient prevention of resource misallocation provides a 
persuasive alternative rationale. The coercer, who knows that the 
threatened suit lacks a reasonable basis, is in the best position to 
prevent the misallocation of resources through disclosure of that fact. 
Nevertheless, in taking advantage of her superior knowledge over the 
other party, she has affirmatively assisted in the misallocation of 
resources to benefit her own interests. The doctrine of duress should 
be administered to force the necessary disclosure and thereby effi­
ciently allocate resources. 
d. Response to Critiques of the Efficient Prevention of Resource 
Misallocation Theory 
The efficient prevention of resource misallocation theory is open 
to criticism on the ground that the test, which is partially based on 
concepts of bargaining and on terms of exchange, is not necessarily 
more persuasive than the traditional test based on concepts of fairness 
reflected in the Restatement.248 The resource misallocation test serves 
as an attractive alternative, however, which has several advantages 
over the fairness test. First, the fairness concept is so . manipulable 
that the result of its application as reflected in case law is inconsistent 
246 See R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 85 (discussing the importance of assigning the risk by 
asking "[wJill imposing liability create incentives for value-maximizing conduct in the future?"). 
'" E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.17, at 260-61; see also Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 
2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959) (finding wrongful conduct amounted to duress when 
defendants knowingly asserted a false claim on property). 
,.. The test based on fairness has been proposed by Professor Dawson, see Dawson, supra 
note 3, and endorsed by others, including Professor Dalton. See Dalton, supra note 5; supra 
text accompanying note 113. 
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and unpersuasive. The efficient prevention of resource misallocation 
theory offers courts additional factors on which to focus and provides 
guidance that may enhance predictability. Second, the resource mis­
allocation theory is advantageous for its ability to explain other factors 
such as the correlation between fraud and duress. Finally, as is 
indicated by the Selmer case discussed above, the resource misallo­
cation theory has a particular advantage when compared with the 
fairness theory based on disproportionality in exchange. 
e. Postscript 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the law should allocate the 
risk of voidability on duress grounds to the party who can most easily 
prevent a misallocation of resources and fails to do so. Nevertheless, 
courts may be able to prevent resource misallocation by refusing to 
entertain duress claims when the alleged victim has a losing contract 
claim.249 If parties with losing contract claims are given an avoidance 
mechanism, they may begin to think that the courts will save them 
from losing deals. Parties will then allocate their resources recklessly 
by undervaluing the risks associated with the business transaction. 
The parties will neglect to take account of the fact that the other 
party may offer them a modified agreement incapable of being attacked 
on duress grounds, but will decide to walk away from the deal 
altogether. If a party has a losing claim on the merits and is permitted 
to prevail on a duress claim, parties will begin to discount the risk 
associated with the losing claim and invest more resources in that 
enterprise. Thus, the risk will tend to become undervalued. 
3. Efficient Economic Results: A Normative Analysis 
A third type of efficiency concern, efficiency of outcome, often 
influences the manner in which duress cases are decided. This concept 
dictates that a court should not allow the duress defense when a 
waste of economic resources or costly overdeterrence would result. A 
theory of efficient normative outcomes may prove useful for identifying 
cases in which duress claims should be permitted. Because of the 
manipulability of their doctrinal elements,250 current theories do not 
2<9 See supra note 146. 

250 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. 
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provide a complete or satisfactory analysis of these cases. 
The prevention of costly overdeterrence by a non-superior risk 
bearer is one normative efficiency concern.251 The superior risk bearer 
is that party to whom a risk should be allocated because she can 
most efficiently reduce the cost of the risk to both parties.252 Courts 
should allocate risk in a manner that coincides with private risk 
allocation253 and, thus, does not prompt costly measures and wasted 
resources. 
Red-Samm Mining Co. v. Port of Seattle254 is an example of a case 
in which the party claiming duress is the superior risk bearer. A 
finding of duress for the claimant here would require the non-superior 
risk bearer to take steps that would be costly, resulting in a waste 
of resources. The plaintiff contractor in Red-Samm bid on a con­
struction contract for the defendant. 255 After the bids were opened, 
the defendant, Port of Seattle, discovered an arithmetical error in 
the calculation of the bid.256 The defendant then offered the plaintiff 
the bid at the lower corrected amount.257 The plaintiff agreed, but 
later argued that it had agreed to the lower amount under compul­
sion.258 The court rejected the duress claim on the basis of the 
availability of reasonable alternatives, including refusing to accept 
the job at that amount.259 The presence of an alternative indicates 
that the second prong of doctrinal duress260 was not met and, thus, 
the duress claim was defeated. 
The doctrinal analysis, however, is not wholly satisfactory. The 
conclusion that no reasonable alternative existed appears to be a label 
that the court attaches to, rather than a persuasive rationale for, the 
".1 Professor Halpern addresses this concept of risk allocation when he states: 
The efficiency analysis, whether in terms of "superior risk bearer" or "least-cost bearer," or 
more general efficiency criteria, is a determination as to how two supposedly risk averse 
parties would have allocated the risk of disruptive events had they been required specifically 
to do so and had their goal been an efficient, least-cost, present transaction. What is involved 
is a complicated set of trade-offs relating to how much each party would have been willing 
to pay to have the other assume the risk. 
Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "The Wisdom 
of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1160 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
26' Id. at 1157-59. 
'53 For a discussion of the would-be private allocation, see Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 597-603 (1982). 
2M 8 Wash. App. 610, 508 P.2d 175 (1973) . 
'''Id. at 612-13, 508 P.2d at 176-77 . 





'59 Id. at 614-16, 508 P.2d at 178-79. 

260 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 

635 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
denial of recovery. The court does not offer a persuasive rationale 
for why the possible alternative of rejecting the bid, and thereby 
losing the job and its contract bid bond, was reasonable. 26 ! In every 
case, the party claiming duress asserts that economic necessities 
dictate acquiescence in the deal, and in each case, the court must 
determine if the available options were "reasonable alternatives" to 
the proffered deal. Unfortunately, this test gives the court discretion 
and offers no guidance to the contracting parties. 
An approach based on either a moral baseline262 or on the wrongful 
act prong of doctrinal duress263 suggests the following analysis of the 
no-recovery result in Red-Samm: Because the Port of Seattle was 
under no legal or moral obligation to accept the contractor's bid, a 
proposal to the contractor on any terms that would close the trans­
action would make the contractor better off and would therefore not 
be wrongful. Measured against a baseline of no deal at all, the proposal 
is a noncoercive offer. 
A legal rights analysis based on either the wrongful act component 
or the moral baseline analysis seems deficient both as an explanatory 
rationale and as a normative standard. Because courts sometimes find 
duress when the option offered the victim is extremely grim or made 
in bad faith, even if the purported coercer acts wholly within her 
lawful rights,264 those approaches fail to explain why the threat to 
exercise a legal right in a particular case is different and therefore 
not subject to attack on duress grounds. 
Because of the shortcomings of current theories, a policy approach 
should be adopted. A persuasive policy reason suggests that the duress 
claim should indeed be rejected in Red-Samm; granting duress might 
promote overdeterrence and inefficiency by prompting the Port of 
Seattle to oversee and double-check all bids made by contractors 
before their submission to insure their accuracy and catch subcon­
tractors' arithmetical errors. Yet, the party in the best position to 
prevent an arithmetical error at the least cost is the party who 
submits the bid. If a court denied the Port of Seattle the right to 
261 See Red-Samm, 8 Wash. App. at 615-16, 508 P.2d at 178-79. 
26' See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. 
.... Arguably what distinguishes those cases in which courts find actionable duress, despite the 
fact that one party was exercising legal rights, is the presence of other factors such as unequal 
bargaining power, unjust enrichment, or bad faith. Since none of these factors are present in 
Red-Samm, there is nothing to make the threat to "deal with me on my terms or not at all" 
a wrongful one. 
This Article suggests that the legal rights analysis is flawed and therefore it might be helpful 
to look to external policy considerations to determine whether a duress claim should be permitted. 
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require performance at the lower corrected dollar figure, the Port, in 
an effort to foreclose the possibility of an agreement being voided, 
might be tempted to hire extra employees to insure that the bidders 
do the correct arithmetic before they submit their bids. This would 
result in a costly waste of resources. If the Port of Seattle made a 
similar offer to the next lowest bidder (who also made a mistake in 
calculation), the Port would risk the repeat result of the bidder voiding 
the agreement. To avoid that result, the Port might insist on reviewing 
the arithmetic of the bids before they were submitted, thus insuring 
against the possibility of a repeated voiding of agreements on duress 
grounds. Yet, the party in the best position to prevent the mistake 
from occurring is the bidder himself. 265 To avoid that costly oversight, 
the court should deny the duress claim. In that way, the recipient 
of the bid will not be induced to undertake expensive and costly 
double-checking of the figures. 
Costly overdeterrence can provide a benchmark for separating valid 
from invalid duress claims in a variety of other contexts as well. 
Overdeterrence may result if parties prevail on duress claims when 
the "coercing party" has acted within the ambit of generally accepted 
behavior and norms.266 To hold otherwise would generate unnecessary 
costs. If courts were to void for duress such commonly accepted 
behavior as a private physician conditioning treatment of a patient 
on the payment of a fair price,267 courts would have a hard time 
convincing doctors that they were exerting unacceptable pressure in 
charging a fair price. 
The costly overdeterrence that may occur if a court voids a contract 
, & Kronman discusses this same concept in connection with unilateral mistake. Kronman, 
supra note 164, at 6-9. 
,.. Acceptable behavioral norms might not be considered a novel test, but merely a different 
label for lawful behavior. Behavioral norms, however, include legal norms as well as social norms. 
A concern with social norms is not novel; some commentators would set the relevant baselines 
by such norms. See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207 (measuring one baseline by 
"what is 'normal' in ... society" ). The focus here is different-it is on the costly waste of 
resources that would result if one were to set baselines at odds with social norms. 
This framework may be helpful in rethinking Eisele v. Ayers, 63 Ill . App. 3d 1039, 381 N.E.2d 
21 (1978). In Eisele, medical students challenged a large tuition increase, partly on duress 
grounds. Id. at 1041-42, 381 N.E.2d at 24. The court rejected the duress claim, stating that, 
"in light of the financial realities and reduced Federal funding," there was nothing "wrong or 
oppressive in [the] defendants' decision to raise tuition." Id. at 1045, 381 N.E.2d at 27. In 
deciding the duress claim, the court might have considered whether a guarantee against large 
tuition increases was a social norm. If not, then it might have been appropriate to reject the 
duress claim; otherwise, it would be costly to deter future coercers who would have to be re­
educated about the acceptable social norms. There is, of course, some circularity in this argument 
since legal decisions can affect the nature of expected social norms of behavior. 
267 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207-08 (discussing the example of the public and private 
physicians). 
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when parties are acting within societal norms is illustrated by Xerox 
Corp. v. ISC Corp.268 In Xerox, the plaintiff, Xerox, contracted to sell 
the defendant, ISC, certain computer software.269 Following a sug­
gestion from Xerox, the defendant leased the computer hardware 
necessary to run the programs from a third party, EDCON, who itself 
had leased this hardware from Xerox.?70 Subsequently, EDCON de­
faulted in rental payments and Xerox cancelled its hardware lease.271 
This left ISC without the hardware necessary to run its programs, 
making the software effectively useless. 272 Xerox then proposed to 
lease directly to ISC the necessary hardware in exchange for a set­
tlement agreement and four promissory notes.273 ISC acquiesced be­
cause it was left in a "difficult position" and needed the equipment.274 
When Xerox sued ISC for failure to pay on the promissory notes, 
ISC argued that the transaction was voidable for duress. 275 The 
defendant contended bad faith in the Xerox cancellation of EDCON's 
lease and improper pressure on the defendant to agree to the new 
lease terms.276 The court refused to find duress, concluding that the 
defendant could not "complain of duress simply because Xerox ter­
minated a contract with a third party who failed to perform that 
contract."277 
Analyzed from a doctrinal standpoint, Xerox had no legal obligation 
to allow ISC access to the hardware. Therefore, an agreement that 
gave ISC access on Xerox's terms, even if unpalatable to ISC, could 
not be wrongful. The question of the wrongfulness of Xerox's actions, 
however, is not quite so clear. First, focusing on legal rights will not 
resolve the duress claim since acting within one's legal rights is not 
an absolute shield.278 The fact that Xerox had a legal right to propose 
any lease terms is therefore not dispositive of the duress issue. 
Moreover, if Xerox is conceptualized as a case about the limits of 
exploiting another's economic necessities, the outcome is uncertain 
since the propriety of capitalizing on a party's weakness to extract 
favorable terms is itself problematic.279 
2" 632 P.2d 618 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). 

269 [d. at 619. 







273 [d. at 619. 








278 See cases cited supra notes 51 and 52. 

27. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
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Efficiency concerns reflected in the policy of upholding agreements 
when the coercer acts within the range of acceptable norms help to 
make the result in the Xerox case compelling. If a court should find 
duress, it would in effect be finding that a party with a lease could 
not cancel that lease even for nonpayment of rent if doing so would 
cause an unrelated third party economic hardship. That result would 
be costly to enforce because it is contrary to behavior that is acceptable 
in the business community.280 For this reason courts should be re­
luctant to grant a duress defense in such circumstances. 
B. Encouraging Disclosure of Unexpected Risks 
Decisions in duress cases should incorporate a policy that encourages 
the disclosure of unusual or unexpected risks and material infor­
mation.281 Failure of one party to disclose an unusual risk or material 
information known only to that party should enable the ignorant 
party to prevail on a duress claim when the "coercer" attempts to 
capitalize on risks that are outside the risks associated with a par­
ticular transaction.282 Granting duress in such circumstances would 
provide an incentive to the knowledgeable party to disclose such 
information and prevent a misallocation of resources based on im­
perfect or incomplete information. This would enhance the efficient 
allocation of resources by giving both parties an incentive to provide 
enough information to allow each of them to determine whether the 
deal they are entering into maximizes value.283 
Adams v. Schiffer284 illustrates why duress claims should succeed 
when the coercer seeks to impose a risk that is not one of the 
normally foreseeable risks of a transaction. In Adams, the defendant, 
Schiffer, purchased property from Adams.285 Thereafter, Adams' son 
Richard made a claim to the property.286 Schiffer gave Richard $10,000 
280 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 203-10. 
28' Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (reflecting on the relationship 
between the unforseeable risks flowing from a contract, and the measure of damages to be 
awarded if those risks occur). 
282 In an analogous situation, in cases involving a unilateral mistake by one party which the 
other party has reason to know about, courts are likely to excuse the mistaken party. See 
Kronman, supra note 164, at 5-9 (discussing the rationale for excusing unilateral mistake). 
"'" Cf. id. at 7-8 (suggesting an allocation of risk to minimize the "joint costs" of a unilateral 
mistake; the risk should be on the party in the best position to prevent a costly mistake) . 
... 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888). 
2& [d. at 16, 17 P. at 22. 
286 [d. at 23, 17 P . at 25-26. 
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to quiet title;287 and then sought reimbursement from Adams senior, 
who refused to pay.288 To pressure Adams, Schiffer persuaded his 
brother, who was his banking partner, to refuse to allow Adams to 
draw on his bank account. 289 Adams ultimately settled in order to 
obtain a release of his funds, and then brought suit to recover the 
settlement.290 The court found that the settlement was void for du­
291ress.
The outcome is not justifiable in doctrinal terms because the court 
did not explain why the pursuit of a legal remedy was not a reasonable 
alternative for Adams senior.292 Nor is it clear that the threat to tie 
up the father's account is illegal and therefore wrongful under the 
Restatement.293 Furthermore, because it is not clear whether the bank's 
refusal to release funds was morally wrongful or whether such conduct 
would constitute a wrongful action sufficient to satisfy the Restate­
ment's requirements, application of the moral baseline theory to 
Adams might be difficult.294 But even if the doctrinal or moral baseline 
approaches do not explain the outcome in Adams, policy considerations 
on disclosure of risk militate in favor of the duress finding. Because 
a bank depositor would not expect his account to be manipulated by 
the bank for actions unrelated to the account, normal expectations 
would be upset if duress were not found. 295 Ordinarily this is not a 
risk that would be foreseeable by a person opening a bank account, 
therefore the burden should be on the other party to disclose that 
risk or forego the opportunity of later exploiting it. 
McCubbin u. BUSS296 provides another example of a failure to disclose 
287Id. at 23, 37-39, 17 P. at 26, 32·33. 
'l8Illd. at 39, 17 P. at 33. 
-Id. at 34, 40, 17 P. at 31, 33. 
290 ld. at 40, 17 P. at 34. 
29IId. 
292 See Dalzell, Duress ll, supra note 40, at 341·42 (discussing Adams v. Schiffer and noting 
the failure of the court to consider whether Adams had alternative remedies available). This 
failure is puzzling in view of the requirement under the Restatement that the party seeking 
relief must have had no other choice or reasonable alternative but acquiescence. See supra note 
108. The policy based on unexpecte4 risks conflicts with the policy discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 132·61, positing the benefits of a policy of judicial economy. Perhaps these 
two competing policies cannot be reconciled, but there is no reason why one should overshadow 
the other. 
293 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. Although the court does conclude that the 
interference with the plaintiff's bank account was an unlawful interference, Adams, 11 Colo. at 
40, 17 P. at 33-34, the withholding of the money constitutes no crime or tort and thus the 
court must decide if the withholding is an improper threat. 
,.. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing how a moral baseline distinguishes 
a coercive from a noncoercive proposal). 
295 See Adams, 11 Colo. at 40, 17 P. at 34 (discussing the normal relationship between a 
depositor and a bank). 
296 180 Neb. 624, 144 N.W.2d 175 (1966). 
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an unexpected risk. In McCubbin, the pfaintiff was a stockholder and 
general manager of a close corporation.297 Shortly after the defendant 
became the majority stockholder, the defendant first tried to persuade 
the plaintiff to agree to a contract that would have cancelled a stock­
purchase contract, and then threatened to terminate plaintiff's em­
ployment in order to induce cancellation of the stock-purchase con­
tract.298 
The plaintiff signed the cancellation contract, but his employment 
was nevertheless terminated. He then brought an action for rescission 
of the cancellation contract and reinstatement of the stock option.299 
The court found business compulsion3 evident on the facts, entitling °O 
the plaintiff to recission and reinstatement of the stock-purchase 
contract.301 
The plaintiff could not have reasonably anticipated that his con­
tinued employment would depend on giving up a stock option.302 
Rather, he would have anticipated that it would depend on his 
performance and economic conditions. Because giving up a stock 
option is not within the normal realm of expected risk, the parties 
would not have bargained regarding that particular risk. For this 
reason, the employer should have an obligation to disclose the risk 
or forego the opportunity to capitalize on it later. This policy of 
disclosing unusual risks to the other party would prevent enforcement 
3of contracts where the risks had not been disclosed.30
297 [d. at 625, 144 N.W.2d at 177. 
298 [d. at 627, 144 N.W.2d at 178. 
298 [d. at 625, 144 N.W.2d at 177. 
300 Business compulsion is another term used to describe economic duress. See, e.g., Dalzell, 
Duress [, supra note 4, at 240 & n.6. 
30' McCubbin, 180 Neb. at 631, 144 N.W.2d at 180. 
302 McCubbin may be explained in two ways other than the policy of requiring certain parties 
to disclose unexpected risks. The first explanation is based on unjust enrichment. Buss was 
arguably unjustly enriched when McCubbin gave up his stock option. An alternative explanation 
for the result is put forth by Professor Farnsworth: "Duress may be found if, for example, an 
employer who has the right to terminate the employment at will threatens to· fire an employee 
as a means of obtaining some unrelated advantage ...." E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 
4.17, at 262; see also Conybeare, supra note 87, at 1028 (discussing the distinction used to 
decide extortion cases that is based on "whether there is a clear nexus between the act threatened 
and the property demanded"). However, the explanation based on the disclosure of unexpected 
risk is a plausible one and is consistent with the fraud cases discussed supra in text accompanying 
notes 211-46. 
303 If one party can easily, and at low cost, disclose information that would affect the other 
party's decision to proceed with the transaction, and the other party would not have expected 
the nondisclosed risk, the duress rules should require disclosure. Illustrative is Peter Matthews, 
Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 943, 499 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1986). In Mabey, a moving 
company, after a truck was loaded with the plaintifrs personal property, refused to proceed 
unless the plaintiff agreed to a $15,000 limit on damages. [d. at 943-44, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 255­
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C. Denying Duress to Avoid Judicial Capability Problems 
Judicial capability304 should also affect the availability of duress 
relief. If granting the duress claim would involve the court in having 
to set a price or undo a transaction that would necessitate a complex 
valuation, the court should be reluctant to grant the duress claim. 
Valuation is best left to the parties,305 and the court should not 
become involved in a question it may be ill-equipped to resolve. On 
the other hand, if judicial grants of duress will not involve the court 
in valuation questions, the court should be more willing to grant 
relief. Recognition of judicial capability problems would help to resolve 
ambiguities that arise under current doctrinal analysis. 
King Enterprises v. Manchester Water Works306 illustrates a case 
in which the granting of relief would have involved the court in 
setting a price for services. In King Enterprises, the plaintiff began 
construction of an apartment complex and then requested that the 
defendant, the city water company, provide the necessary water. 30? 
The defendant responded by demanding the payment of an assess­
ment, but the plaintiff refused to pay the requested amount.30B Sub­
sequently, the parties agreed to a price concession.309 After construc­
tion of the water main was undertaken by the defendant, however, 
the plaintiff refused to pay, alleging that the agreement was void for 
duress.310 In its analysis, the King Enterprises court recognized the 
two key doctrinal elements of duress: a wrongful act and an absence 
of reasonable alternatives.31l To resolve whether the agreement was 
56. The plaintiff argued duress and the court found "facts sufficient to withstand [the defendant's 
motion for) summary judgment" noting that the plaintiff had no "practical alternative to 
compliance." ld. at 944, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 256. 
Mabey can also be analyzed in terms of forced disclosure. The defendant could have easily 
disclosed the $15,000 damage limit before the plaintiff agreed to use his services; therefore a 
failure to disclose that fact should preclude the defendant from capitalizing on the limit since 
the plaintiff could reasonably have anticipated that a mover would provide full coverage absent 
disclosure on limits of liability. Forcing the disclosure would have the societal benefit of meeting 
the parties' reasonable expectations alld of permitting similarly situated plaintiffs to devote 
their resources to their highest valued uses. 
30. See supra note 43. 
au:. Leaving valuation to the parties is a main tenet of classical contract law. Dalton, supra 
note 3, at 1068. This concept has come under attack recently by critics who have postulated 
the importance of public policy considerations that run counter to these classic individualistic 
values. See supra note 5. 
",. 122 N.H. 1011, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982). 

307 1d. at 1013, 453 A.2d at 1276-77. 







311 ld. at 1014, 453 A.2d at 1277. 
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in fact voluntary, the court looked at the fairness of the bargaining 
process.312 The court found the agreement to be "a product of free 
and voluntary negotiations" because the purported coercer engaged 
in a give-and-take with the alleged victim, and made a price conces­
sion.313 The court found no wrongful acts by the defendant.314 
The court concluded that duress should not be available because 
the water company did not cause the developer's need for water 
connections to become acute, and in fact the developer himself caused 
the crisis and had reasonable alternatives.315 Yet, these rationales do 
not necessarily insulate an agreement from attack on duress grounds 
and thus they may not represent the best analysis. 
A policy that might provide more effective guidance to a court than 
that offered by the doctrinal analysis is the judicial capability policy. 
Granting duress relief in the King Enterprises case would have en­
meshed the court in determining the appropriate price for the water 
connections. This problem is likely to occur because once the agree­
ment between the parties is voided, the water works company may 
now bring a lawsuit to recover the reasonable value of the requested 
connections. The court should be reluctant to void the agreement on 
grounds of duress because it would embroil the court in a price 
dispute.316 Because the court's doctrinal analysis is not necessarily 
compelling, judicial capability more appropriately justifies the finding 
of no duress. To avoid judicial capability problems, there should be 
a willingness to grant duress relief when that finding will not enmesh 
the court in economic evaluations. Courts should be more willing to 
31. [d. at 1014-15, 453 A.2d at 1277-78. 
313 [d. at 1014, 453 A.2d at 1277. Nevertheless, if voluntariness is the test, it is not clear why 
some negotiating indicates that a final proposal by the putative coercer is any more acceptable 
or voluntarily assented to under the circumstances. 
31' [d., 453 A.2d at 1278. 
31. [d. at 1014-15, 453 A.2d at 1278; see supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
316 Another case in which a grant of the duress claim would enmesh the court in an economic 
evaluation that a court may be ill-equipped to handle on judicial capability grounds is Grad v. 
Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964). In Grad,' the plaintiff was 
indebted to the defendant for engineering services. [d. at 72, 198 N.E.2d at 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 
at 634. To pressure the plaintiff into paying the debt, the defendant refused to transfer stock 
to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff paid his debt. [d. at 73, 198 N.E.2d at 27, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 
635. The plaintiff agreed to secure the stock transfer, but later argued the agreement should 
be voidable for duress. [d. The court disagreed, stating that it was "but simple justice" for the 
defendant to exploit his strategic stock advantage. [d. at 74, 198 N.E.2d at 28, 248 N.Y.S.2d 
at 636. 
Under a contrary holding the plaintiff would have been able to rescind the agreement regarding 
the debt and to recover the money paid, but this would have required the court to evaluate 
the defendant's release of the stock. If the debt agreement is voided, the court might have to 
readjust the terms of the stock deal to account for the lost ability to secure the payment. That 
valuation might be one the court is ill-equipped to handle. 
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grant relief if they can simply undo a transaction without facing the 
added burden of making economic evaluations. The court may, for 
example, void a deed executed by an anguished parent which was 
conveyed to a third party to prevent the criminal prosecution of an 
adult child.317 This would entail no complex valuation question since 
the court can simply reverse the transaction. Similarly, even when a 
grant of duress upsets a transaction, but there is clear evidence of 
what the parties thought the services were worth, there will not be 
judicial capacity problems. The court in those instances would not 
be starting from scratch in setting prices. 
The judicial capability concept is illustrated by Rich & Whitlock, 
Inc.3 18 Inc. v. Ashton Development, In Rich & Whillock the parties 
agreed on a price for excavation work and also agreed that any extra 
rock work would be done at current rental rates.319 The general 
contractor's actions caused the subcontractor to believe that there 
would be no problem with payment.320 After the subcontractor com­
pleted performance, the general contractor offered a reduced amount 
to cover the additional expense.321 Granting the duress claim in this 
case would not involve the court in an inquiry into the appropriate 
payment because the parties had already agreed that current rental 
rates would apply. The court can therefore undo the transaction 
without taking on the added burden of determining the value of the 
services. The court should therefore be more willing to grant relief. 
D. 	 Judicial Risk Reallocation: Speculation at the Other Party's 
Expense 
Risk allocation322 provides another guide for deciding duress cases. 
If the parties have allocated risks in a certain fashion, and one party 
tries to rely on duress so as to reallocate the risk, duress should not 
317 See Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W.2d 2 (1985). 

31' 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984) . 

JI. [d. at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 87. 

320 [d., 204 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88. 

321 [d. at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
m Risk allocation concepts also figure prominently in the doctrine of commercial impractic­
ability. See Halpern, supra note 251, at 1160-61 (discussing the efficiency model for allocating 
risks in a way that is consistent with the allocation parties would have made for future 
contingencies had the requisite information been available). 
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be available.323 Reallocation of risk on grounds of duress would en­
courage economic negligence by protecting parties from erroneous risk 
calculations. Moreover, such reallocation of risk by the courts would 
contribute to the misallocation of resources. Parties would have to 
assume the risk that courts will bailout the losing party. Even when 
the parties do not allocate the risks explicitly, the court should not 
grant a duress claim when doing so would make the transaction 
essentially risk free for the complaining party. Moreover, permitting 
parties to have it both ways324 and voiding contracts whenever it is 
desirable to do so, would upset the basic tenet of contract law, which 
prohibits parties from speculating at one another's expense.325 Finally, 
most parties expect that if risks are assumed on both sides, there is 
equivalence in the deal. Permitting duress in those circumstances 
would unduly burden the party who must ferret out involuntariness 
in circumstances that bespeak normalcy.326 
Risk reallocation concepts are illustrated by First Data Resources, 
Inc. v. Omaha Steaks International. 327 Under the contract involved in 
First Data, either party could terminate the agreement on ninety days 
notice. ~28 The plaintiff wrote a letter notifying the defendant that it 
would exercise its right to terminate the contract unless a higher 
price was negotiated.329 The defendant agreed to a price increase, but 
later refused to pay.330 When the plaintiff sued for payment, the 
defendant sought to avoid the agreement on duress grounds.331 
First Data can be explained under the current doctrinal approach 
of determining the existence of an improper threat and of a reasonable 
alternative.332 The advantage of the risk allocation analysis (discussed 
323 Arguably, the disinclination to reallocate risks is merely another way of saying that if the 
party is acting within her legal rights, then duress should not be available, but if a party is 
exceeding her legal rights, then duress should be available. By definition, if a party is acting 
within her legal rights, she is not trying to reallocate risks, while if a party is exceeding her 
legal rights she may be trying to do so. Nevertheless, risk reallocation analysis offers several 
advantages. It provides a persuasive economic rationale for case results. It may also help to 
reach a result when doctrinal limitations do not provide a clear answer. See infra text accom­
panying notes 327-41. 
32< Courts are reluctant to permit a party to "have its cake and eat it too." Red-Samm Mining 
Co. v. Port of Seattle, 8 Wash. App. 610, 616, 508 P .2d 175, 178 (1973) . 
32'. For a discussion of the anti -speculation policy in contract law as it is manifested in the 
mutuality of obligation principle, see E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 107-08. 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 162-209. 
327 209 Neb. 327, 307 N.W.2d 790 (1981) . 
:128 [d. at 329, 307 N.W.2d at 792. 
329 [d. 
:lO0 [d. at 329-30, 307 N.W.2d at 792. 
OJ I [d. at 330-31 , 307 N.W.2d at 792. 
3.12 Since the contract permitted termination upon ninety days notice, it was not improper to 
give notice. Thus there was no improper threat and any proposal that made the recipient "better 
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below) over these modes of analysis is that it provides a persuasive 
economic rationale for the no duress result. 
Application of risk allocation concepts333 suggests that voiding the 
modified agreement should not be allowed because it would insulate 
the defendant from one of the very risks that he initially undertook. 
The defendant took the risk that after the contract was terminated 
pursuant to its terms any aspect of the contract could be renegotiated, 
including the price. Permitting a duress claim to succeed would in 
effect give the defendant a better deal than he received from the 
contract. It would also give contracting parties an incentive to ac­
quiesce in modifications, knowing they could later avoid them on the 
ground of duress. Thus they would be insulated from risk and gain 
one-sided protection from the courts. 
First Data can also be analyzed in terms of misallocation of re­
sources. The defendant, knowing that without the price increase the 
plaintiff would terminate the contract, contributes to the plaintiff's 
misallocation of resources by abiding by the modified contract terms 
in order to get a temporary extension of the contract. The risk 
allocation analysis suggests that duress should not be granted when 
doing so would make the transaction risk-free for one party at the 
expense of the other. Permitting the duress claim under such cir­
cumstances would contribute to an easily preventable misallocation 
of resources. In these cases, the party who is attempting to gain a 
risk-free transaction knows at the time of formation that there would 
have been no deal if the other party had known that the supposed 
victim intended to speculate at the other's expense and then allege 
duress to get out of a transaction if it turned out to be unfavorable. 
Because no one would enter into such a transaction, the party who 
plans to speculate is in the best position to prevent a misallocation 
of resources and the duress defense should not be allowed to that 
party. 
Higgins u. Brunswick Corp.334 typifies the problem of permitting a 
claim of duress by a party attempting to insulate itself from risk. In 
Higgins, the plaintiffs, real estate brokers, constructed a bowling alley 
and purchased bowling equipment from the defendants.335 Subse­
quently, when the plaintiffs defaulted in their payments and filed a 
off" than he would be upon termination would be a noncoercive offer. A moral baseline approach 
suggests the same result since the plaintiff has no obligation to continue the contract. Never­
theless, since the contractual rights test is so manipulable as to be an unreliable mode of 
analysis , exclusive reliance on it seems misplaced. 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 322·32. 

334 76 Ill. App. 3d 273, 395 N.E.2d 81 (1979). 

""" [d. at 274, 395 N.E.2d at 83. 
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petition for bankruptcy, the defendants filed an action seeking re­
possession of the equipment and payment of the outstanding bal­
ance.336 The defendants agreed to abandon the legal action and to 
satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs' unsecured creditors in return for 
a lease for the bowling alley.337 Plaintiffs agreed, but later attempted 
to rescind the lease on the grounds of duress.338 The court rejected 
the claim based on the voluntariness of the agreement, the plaintiffs' 
access to counsel, the defendant's innocence in the plaintiffs' economic 
reversals, and the absence of any bargaining power abuse.339 Because 
some of these factors are manipulable by the courts340 and are either 
not sufficient in themselves or too conclusory to justify a finding of 
duress, the relevant focus should be the normative issue: Should 
duress be available as a defense? 
The better explanation for denying relief to the plaintiffs in Higgins 
can be found in the plaintiffs' attempt to insulate themselves from 
all risk. The defendants took a calculated risk that the bowling alley 
would not be profitable enough to justify the agreed upon rent; the 
plaintiffs took the risk that the lease would turn out to be more 
valuable than the rent. Under these circumstances, granting duress 
relief to a party who has gambled and lost on a calculated risk in 
effect allows one party to speculate at the expense of the other and 
to recapture an opportunity that he has foregone in contracting.341 
This approach fails to put the requisite pressure on the party in the 
best position to prevent a misallocation of resources. 
E. Reliance: Its Actual and Desired Effect on Outcome 
Another factor which does and should affect outcome is the relative 
degree of reliance between the purported coercer and alleged victim.342 
If the victim has relied to its detriment on assurances by the coercer 
336 [d. at 275, 395 N.E.2d at 83. 
337 [d. 
""8 Id. at 276, 395 N.E.2d at 84. 
339 [d. at 277-78, 395 N.E.2d at 85-86. 
340 For instance, the voluntariness test has no established standards and thus is easily ma­
nipulated. Furthermore, the defendant's participation, or lack thereof, in the plaintiff's economic 
reversals is not always determinative of whether the agreement is voidable for duress. See supra 
notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
3" Burton, Breach of Contract and the Comnwn Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. 
L. REV. 369, 376-38 (1980) (discussing breach of contract as an attempt to recapture "forgone 
opportunities") . 
:.., Professor Hillman disputes the importance of reliance as a precondition for arguing a 
successful duress claim. See Hillman, Contract Modifications, supra note 162, at 872. 
647 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
and the coereer has not relied in an equivalent fashion, the court 
should be more willing to grant the victim's duress claim. If, however, 
the alleged coercer has relied to its detriment on the victim's assur­
ances in a way that the victim has not, the court should be more 
likely to deny the duress claim. Where neither the victim nor coercer 
has relied detrimentally, the court should consider the other policies 
outlined in this Article when determining whether to grant relief. 
Wurtz v. Fleischman343 provides an illustration of disparate reliance 
between the coercer and victim. In Wurtz, the buyer and seller entered 
into a real estate deal in which the buyer agreed to pay with an 
exchange of property rather than with cash for the seller's tax benefit.344 
Pursuant to the agreement, the seller commenced a search for property 
suitable for the exchange.345 The buyer purchased a McDonald's 
restaurant at the seller's request.346 Because the restaurant was only 
valued at $246,400 and the agreement called for $300,000 in real 
estate, the parties agreed to an extension to give the seller time to 
decide on the additional property needed to close the deal,347 After 
the buyer expended $150,000 to purchase the restaurant, the seller 
threatened to cancel the closing unless the buyer came up with an 
extra $50,000 worth of property.348 To close the deal, the buyer agreed, 
but later claimed duress.349 Because an exclusive reliance on doctrinal 
analysis would be likely to result in inconsistent outcomes for similar 
fact patterns in such cases,350 this Article advocates that the courts 
34" 89 Wis. 2d 291, 278 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 293 N.W.2d 155 
(1980). Although reversed, the Wurtz appellate court's rendition of the facts provide a good 
basis for discussion. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the appellate court "exceeded its authority . . . 
by making factual determinations in lieu of, and in addition to, the findings made by the trial 
court." Wurtz, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 102, 293 N.W.2d 155, 156 (1980). The case was remanded to 
the trial court to "make the necessary findings" for appellate review. Id. at 109, 293 N.W.2d 
at 159-60. 
3" Wurtz, 89 Wis. 2d at 298, 278 N.W.2d at 268. 
" " Id. 
"s Id. 
347 Id. 
3'SId. at 299, 303, 278 N.W.2d at 269, 270. 
3.9Id. at 300, 278 N.W.2d at 269. 
as. In Wurtz, it would be difficult to resolve the propriety of the threat not to close unless 
additional value were forthcoming. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1979). 
Courts have dealt with similar claims in the real estate context and have reached different 
conclusions on the availability of duress. Compare Smelo v. Girard Trust Co., 158 Pa. Super. 
473, 45 A.2d 264 (1946) (developer who paid $3,000 down and incurred additional obligations 
was found to be the victim of duress, and a modified agreement, which obligated him to pay 
penalties on back taxes and which was signed to prevent cancellation of a land sale, was found 
to be voidable) with London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262 
(1965) (even though plaintiff expended more than $150,000 in reliance on first agreement, duress 
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focus on reliance concerns. The buyer -had relied by making expen­
ditures at the seller's request.351 The seller demonstrated no equivalent 
detrimental reliance.352 Therefore, it may be appropriate to grant a 
duress claim. 
Use of the reliance factor to decide duress claims is supported by 
several factors. First, to the extent that reliance results in a benefit 
to the coercer, the coercer should be made to pay. Any agreements 
which avoid that obligation should be vOIdable. Second, to the extent 
that the reliance is foreseeable, and exploited by the coercer, duress 
should be granted on the theory that otherwise the party in the best 
position to avoid a resource misallocation would benefit from a failure 
to do so. Finally, a denial of duress will increase the costs of con­
tracting in the future. Parties will refuse to accede to other parties' 
requests for their reliance expenditures without significant guarantees 
of performance. 
F. Societal Effects of Treatment of Duress Claims 
Another policy goal that courts should consider in duress claims 
is the effect that the decision will have on behavior that society wants 
to encourage or discourage. If the denial of duress will harm important 
societal goals, then the duress claim should be granted.353 The im­
portance of these societal goals should override technical and doctrinal 
deficiencies of duress claims. Conversely, if a denial of duress will 
promote important goals, the defense should be available. This social 
policy helps to rationalize and justify results in the cases that cannot 
be explained under current theories. 
In S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Authority, 354 
the municipality granted certain necessary permits to a developer 
sufficient to void the renegotiated agreement was not found). In some of the cases focusing on 
the "no reasonable alternative" criteria courts have found that a victim's failure to pursue 
litigation dooms the duress claim, even if the delay caused by the litigation would entail economic 
hardship. See, e.g., id. (because plaintiff did not sue for breach of the original contract due to 
business pressures, the court found that the renegotiated contract, in which plaintiff agreed to 
pay an additional $650 per acre, was voluntarily entered into). Other courts have reached 
contrary results. See, e.g., Ross Sys. v. Linden Dari·Delite, Inc., 35 N.J . 329, 337, 173 A.2d 
258, 263 (1961) (" [TJested by the practicalities of the business situation in which the defendants 
here found themselves, we think they had no adequate remedy through any form of litigation." ). 
:)oJ Wurtz, 89 Wis. 2d at 303, 278 N.W.2d at 270. 
,., [d. at 304, 278 N.W.2d at 271. 
353 As noted supra note 37, Professor Wertheimer would discount the importance of societal 
effects in deciding duress claims. 
"" 62 N.J . 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) . 
649 1989] Duress Policy Guide 
that were conditioned on the developer's entering into a written 
contract for adequate sewage connections.355 The developer entered a 
contract by which he agreed to pay $900 for each sewage connection 
and also agreed to disclaim that any coercion had been applied by 
the Authority.356 The developer later contended that the charges should 
only have been $700357 and that the payments had been made to the 
Authority under coercion.358 
A grant of relief here is not easily justified under a doctrinal analysis 
because there is no showing that the claimant explored other rea­
sonable alternatives. But the public policy implications of denying 
the duress claim to the developer, and the incentives to undesirable 
behavior that would result, dictate a finding of duress. Were the court 
to deny that coercion existed in S.S. & 0., the Authority would have 
a strong incentive to disregard clear legal mandates. Moreover, because 
the Authority engages in many transactions with developers, it would 
be more efficient to deter the Authority than to put the risk on each 
individual developer.359 Thus, the public policy analysis helps to resolve 
an ambiguity in the doctrinal analysis. 
The public policy of providing incentives for economic development 
would resolve other duress claims when the resolution would otherwise 
be uncertain under doctrinal tests or other theories of coercion. In 
Lustgarten v. Jones,360 the plaintiffs wanted to enter the gasohol 
market and sought out defendants because of their business contacts 
and expertise.361 The parties reached an agreement to form a cor­
poration pursuant to which each subscribed to a certain number of 
shares.362 After the agreement was made, defendants contacted an oil 
company to obtain a lease for the new corporation.363 Because the 
new company was undercapitalized, the oil company declined.364 There­
after, defendants informed plaintiffs that the company's finances were 
hampering efforts to successfully enter the gasohol market.365 The 
3.. [d. at 372, 301 A.2d at 740. 
356 [d. at 372-73, 301 A.2d at 740. 
351 [d. at 376, 301 A.2d at 742. 
356 [d. at 371, 301 A.2d at 739. 
3" For efficient deterrence purposes it would be important to deter municipal authorities rather 
than developers. See generaUy Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study 
in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 127-35 (1988) (suggesting that efficient 
deterrence policies would place the incentives for deterrence on the professional wrongdoer). 
360 220 Neb. 585, 371 NW.2d 668 (1985). 
36 1 [d. at 586, 371 N.W.2d at 669. 
3.' [d. at 586-87, 371 N.W.2d at 669-70. 
363 [d. at 587, 371 NW.2d at 670. 
364 [d. 
365 [d. at 588, 371 N.W.2d at 670. 
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parties entered a new agreement that voided the earlier stock agree­
ment.366 The plaintiffs then sued to void the second agreement on 
the ground of duress.367 The plaintiffs, who were seeking recission, 
argued that duress arose from the" 'substantial difference in economic 
position and busIness experience'" between the parties.368 In rejecting 
a duress claim based on the above facts, the court found that the 
pressure arose not from actions of the defendant, but from the actions 
of third party oil companies.369 Moreover, the court found that the 
deal was not "unjust, unconscionable or illegal."370 
The doctrinal analysis is deficient for resolving the question on 
these facts. First, the court's emphasis on the fact that the purported 
coercer was not the cause of the economic adversity for the plaintiffs 
is, as demonstrated earlier, a manipulable factor and not determinative 
of outcome.371 But even when the coercer exploits the economic 
necessities of the duress claimant, which the claimant herself caused, 
the exploitation may in some instances be sufficient to justify a 
finding of wrongful pressure.372 
A morality-based analysis would focus on the propriety of the 
coercer's actions.373 Under a strict rights normative analysis one might 
conclude that the defendants had the "right" to request a termination 
of the agreement since they were not bound by the first agreement 
to stay in business with the plaintiffs forever. Application of a strict 
rights analysis would examine whether the defendants had the right 
to request that the earlier agreement be replaced with a different 
agreement. Arguably, since the earlier agreement did not specifically 
prohibit termination, there was no limit on the right to terminate. 
Yet it is difficult to determine in the abstract whether the defendants' 
request for termination was wrongful. The problem with the rights 
analysis is that the determination as to when rights exist or when 
one is obligated to do something is manipulable and therefore in­
conclusive.374 Such threats mayor may not be wrongful when measured 
against a baseline which is not absolute. 375 Where the line is drawn 
depends on value judgments about what kind of behavior society 
366 [d. 
367 [d. at 589, 371 N.W.2d at 671. 
366 [d. 
J69 [d. at 592, 371 N.W.2d at 672. It would therefore be inefficient to deter the defendant. 
370 Id. 
371 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
372 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text. 
"" See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra notes 96-107. 
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wants to promote or will tolerate. It is important that these lines be 
drawn since there does not seem to be any easy means of resolving 
the issue according to ambiguous or abstract rights. 
Because the moral baseline standards are manipulable, the duress 
determination should be based on social policy considerations. The 
relevant question to ask is what kind of behavior does society want 
to permit in a situation involving a risky business venture that one 
party decides to terminate when the business encounters difficulties? 
If proposals to terminate the business are voidable for duress when 
the venture fails, then one party is insulated against the risk of the 
venture failing. Such a result would contravene expected business 
norms that each party assumes the risk of failure. Otherwise, one 
party would be offering to indemnify the other, thus discouraging 
investment in new ventures. Parties with expertise would be reluctant 
to provide help to a fledgling company if the other party could insulate 
itself from all risk should the venture fail. Policy concerns suggest 
that the duress claim be denied to insure requisite incentives for 
business ventures. 
G. Economic Negligence and Duress Case Outcomes 
A final policy which courts should consider in deciding duress cases 
is the encouragement of economic industriousness and discouragement 
of economic negligence. If the denial of duress would provide a 
disincentive to careful economic planning by someone who is a position 
to plan and to minimize the "joint costs" of a mistake,376 then the 
duress claim should be granted. 
Beznos v. Martin,377 described previously,378 illustrates a situation 
in which economic negligence concerns should affect the duress claim. 
The plaintiff in Beznos owned two adjacent lots, one of which was 
vacant.379 While the plaintiff was negotiating to sell the lot with the 
house, he sold the vacant lot to the defendant.380 It turned out that 
the driveway from Lot 1 encroached on the defendant's vacant lot.38J 
The defendant then threatened to destroy the driveway unless he 
"6 Kronman, supra note 164, at 14. 

m 22 Mich. App. 376, 177 N.w.2d 226 (1970). 

378 See supra notes 147-61 (describing Beznos and analyzing the facts in terms of both judicial 

economy and the Restatement). 
379 Beznos, 22 Mich. App. at 377, 177 N.W.2d at 226. 
380 Id., 177 N.W.2d at 226-27. 
381 Id., 177 N.W.2d at 227. 
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was paid $1,500 for a reconveyance.382 The-plaintiff acquiesced because 
the destruction of the driveway would have prevented the sale of the 
lot with the house.383 The plaintiff later argued that the agreement 
to pay $1,500 in return for the deed was executed under duress.384 
Accepting that the case would be difficult to decide under current 
doctrinal approaches,385 consider how the case would be resolved by 
an economic industriousness analysis. Since property owners are in 
the best position to know what they are selling and would not have 
to undertake search costs to determine what they own, that party 
should be allocated the risk that the property is different than what 
is deeded. Moreover, allocation of the risk to the purchaser would 
increase the burden of contracting to an undesirable level. The pur­
chaser would have no reason to suspect that when he bought the 
property, he received less than all of the rights that were promised. 
Permitting a duress claim to succeed in Beznos would be a disin­
centive to the seller to use care in describing the property to be sold. 
Moreover, the seller, who is in the best position to prevent a mis­
allocation of resources, would not be encouraged to do so. Thus, in 
order to encourage careful economic planning and to prevent resource 
misallocation, the seller should not be permitted to avoid a contract 
on duress grounds. 
Avoidance on duress grounds also should not be available where it 
would insulate a party from the consequences of his own mistakes 
and economic miscalculations. This might encourage business people 
to think that the courts would give them an out and save them from 
the usual consequences of their contract defaults. This might also 
encourage them to invest in contracts on the mistaken assumption 
that courts would reallocate the losses to favor one party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts confront difficult choices when they decide which factual 
3.2 [d. at 377-78, 177 N.W.2d at 227. 

383Id. at 378,177 N.W.2d at 227. 

3.. Id. 
w'See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text; see also USLife Title Co. v. Gutkin. 152 
Ariz. 349, 732 P .2d 579 (1986) . This case provides another example of a case in which an 
economic analysis would be beneficial. The vendors intended to convey certain property to the 
purchasers, but the property was not so conveyed because of escrow agent's clerical error in 
preparing the deed. Id. at 353, 732 P.2d at 583. The court found that it did not constitute 
duress for the vendors to insist on a $17,000 payment to convey the disputed property. Id. at 
356, 732 P.2d at 586. Any other result would encourage the escrow agent to be negligent in 
preparing other deeds, which would create incentive for sloppy preparation of deeds by party 
in charge. 
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situations warrant relief on duress grounds. The current articulations 
and applications of the duress rule are unsatisfactory. Moreover, the 
available theories of coercion are both inherently unworkable and 
inadequate because they do not address central policy issues. Con­
sequently, courts do not consistently reach sound results. 
Policy considerations based on efficiency, reliance, judicial capa­
bility, disclosure of unexpected risks, and economic incentives must 
be integrated into the law of duress. Such integration would enhance 
the predictability of judicial decision making by offering an alternative 
analysis for courts to use when doctrinal elements of duress prove 
difficult to apply. Moreover, this approach would achieve certain 
societal benefits. It would enhance the preservation of limited judicial 
resources, contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources, dis­
courage speculation in contracting, and provide appropriate incentives 
for economic industriousness. The courts should incorporate these 
policy concerns and develop guidelines consistent with them in order 
to achieve rational and effective decisionmaking in duress cases. 
